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I. Introduction
In 1993, after filing suit against his employer, Eldon Kenseth received
$229,501.37 from his employer pursuant to a settlement agreement.1 Of that
$229,501.37, Kenseth's attorneys kept $91,800 in accordance with the contin-
gency fee agreement they had with Kenseth.2 The question that emerges from
this transaction is deceptive and ultimately difficult to answer: Is the $91,800
part of Kenseth's gross income for tax purposes?3 This question becomes very
important as the negative tax implications of the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) factor into the equation.4 Given the Internal Revenue Code's standard
that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived," the
answer would seem to be a straightforward yes.- Yet, various courts have
struggled with that question and reached divergent conclusions, resulting in a
circuit split."
1. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,404 (2000), aft'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 405.
3. Id. at 400.
4. See id. at 406 (noting that AMT increases Kenseth's tax burden by S17,198 if con-
tingency fee is included in Kenseth's gross income); see also I.R.C. §§ 55-56 (1994) (providing
statutory basis forAMT); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313 (10th Cir. 2001) (notingthat
"[if the AMT did not apply, any fees Petitioner paid to his attorneys would qualify as a deductible
expense" but that "under the AMT's provisions, certain miscellaneous deductions, including
attorney fees, are eliminated"), Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 946 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that
application of AMT "smacks ofinjustice" when clients' gross income includes contingency fees).
The potential "injustice" of the AMT comes into play after a court classifies a contingency fee as
gross income to a client. The client may classify the contingency fee as an itemized deduction
under § 212(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits an itemized deduction for expenses
incurred "for the production and collection of income." I.R.C. § 212(1) (1994). Although the 2%
floor of § 67 and the overall limitation of § 68 restrict the amount of the deduction, the taxpayer
may still take a substantial deduction for the legal fee. I.R.C. §§ 67-68 (1994). However, the
deduction is unavailable to any taxpayer subject to the AMT. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994); see
Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946-47 (finding that AMT provisions disallow itemized deductions for
payment of legal fees); see also Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines
CivilRights Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075,1076-79 (2000) (discussing negative impact ofAMT's
disallowance of miscellaneous itemized deductions on "national policy of encouraging meritori-
ous civil rights claims"); Darren J. Campbell, Comment, Wiping the Slate Clean: An Examination
on How a Court's Characterization of Contingent Attorney's Fees Implicates the Alternative
Minimum Tax andAffects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 171,185-89(2001) (explaining
how AMT disallows deductions for attorney's fees, which has effect of greatly increasing tax-
payer's gross income). Sager and Cohen note that the disallowance of a miscellaneous itemized
deduction for attorneys' fees under the AMT's statutory structure "would convert a S5,000 before-
tax gain into a $48,900 after-tax loss" inAlexander. Sager & Cohen, supra, at 1078.
5. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994); see also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)
(explaining that statutory definition of gross income indicates that Congress intended to use "the
full measure of its taxing power").
6. Compare Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming
lower court's ruling that portion of condemnation award paid to attorneys pursuant to contin-
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Courts have utilized two primary theories of attribution to determine who
bears the tax liability for contingency fees: the assignment of income doc-
trine7 and state attorney's liens laws." As courts have used these theories of
gency fee agreement constitutes gross income to client) with Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119,
125 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding contingency fees paid to attorneys are not gross income to
plaintiff). See also Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279 n.7 (I Ith Cir. 2001) (recogniz-
ing existence of circuit split on issue of taxation of contingency fees paid to attorneys); Young
v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 377-79 (4th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging divergence of views among
circuit courts as to taxation of contingency fees); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 358 (5th
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging existence of circuit split on issue of taxation of attorneys' contingent
fees); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting existence of circuit split on issue of taxation of attorneys' contingent fees). The circuit
split does not involve the issue of the inclusion of the contingency fee in the attorney's gross
income. Any legal fees paid to the attorney are gross income to the attorney as compensation
for professional services. I.R.C. § 61(aXl) (1994).
7. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1940) (explaining that assignment of
income doctrine attributes income to party with ultimate control over disposal of income); Lucas
v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1,1, 114-15 (1930) (establishing assignment of income doctrine); Coady v.
Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that assignment of income doctrine
prevents taxpayers from avoiding taxation on income by "making anticipatory arrangements"),
cert. denied 532 U.S. 972 (2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(relying on both Maryland's attorney's lien law and judicial assignment of income doctrine to
conclude that plaintiff's gross income includes contingency fees); see also infra notes 79-127
and accompanying text (discussing assignment of income doctrine).
8. See Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r,274 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that contingency fees constitute gross income to client irrespective of state attorney's lien statute
but noting that Missouri lien statute would favor same outcome); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d
369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that contingency fee is includable in client's gross income
because North Carolina law does not grant attorney "rights to the cause of action or a right equal
to that of the client"); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 363-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that taxpayer's gross income excludes contingency fees despite attorney's limited rights to
client's recovery under Texas law and despite assignment of income doctrine); Benci-Woodward
v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because California's attorney
lien's law does not give attorney ownership interest in client's recovery, client's gross income
includes contingency fee paid to attorney), cert denied 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Davis v. Comm'r,
210 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming determination that contingency fees paid to
attorney are not gross income to client); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States,
202 F.3d 854, 856-58 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because Michigan's common law
attorney's lien provides attorneys with ownership interest in their clients' recoveries and because
assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to contingency fee arrangement, contingency fee
paid to attorney is not gross income to client); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th
Cir. 1959) (determining that because Alabama's attorney's lien statute gives attorneys ownership
interest in their clients' recovery and because assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable,
contingency fee is not gross income to client); Foster v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1237-38 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (following Cotnam as precedent in finding that amount of contingency
fee is to be excluded from taxpayer's gross income), afd, 249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001);
Sinyard v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 654,658-59 (1998) (noting that attorneys in Arizona "are
not permitted to acquire proprietary interests in funds recovered on behalf of their clients" and
finding attorneys' fees to be gross income to client), aff'd, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
infra notes 128-54 and accompanying text (discussing state attorney's lien doctrine).
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attribution, the resulting disagreement over the tax consequences of contin-
gency fees has emerged as a by-product of the courts' failure to characterize
accurately the attorney-client relationship under a contingency fee agreement.9
Courts have suggested that the attorney and client are involved in a partner-
ship, a joint venture, or a division of property.1" Yet, none of these analogies
have successfully characterized the relationship between an attorney and a
client bound by a contingency fee agreement." Courts have struggled to
ascertain who is really in control of the client's lawsuit, the client or the
attorney. 12 The relative amount of control that an attorney maintains over the
client's cause of action is the key to understanding the tax consequences of
any contingency fee.
13
Clients often surrender a large degree of control over their claim to their
attorney by signing a contingency fee agreement.' 4 Under these agreements,
an attorney agrees to work for the client in exchange for a portion of any
recovery obtained through the representation. 5 The attorney handles almost
all aspects of the client's case: filing the complaint, taking depositions, nego-
9. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 453-55 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing failure of current analogies to explain adequately attorney-client relationship for tax
purposes), af'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
10. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353,360 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing contingency
fee arrangement between attorney and client as "a sort of virtual co-ownership" of client's
claim); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir.
2000) (explaining that Clarka' contract with his lawyer is similar to "an interest in a partnership
agreement or joint venture"). The Estate of Clarks court also stated that "[t]he present trans-
action under scrutiny is more like a division of property than an assignment of income." Id. at
857-58.
11. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text (discussing failure of certain analogies
to meet necessary requirements for explaining tax consequences of contingency fees); see also
Susan Kalinka, A.L. Clarks Eat and the Taxation of Contingent Fees Paid to an Attorney,
TAXES, Apr. 2000, at 16 (questioning use of joint venture and co-ownership analogies for
characterizing contingent fee arrangements for tax purposes).
12. See generally infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text (discussing failure of
assignment of income doctrine and attorney's lien laws to determine who controls client's
lawsuit).
13. See Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948) ("The crucial question remains
whether the assignor retains sufficient power and control over the assigned property or over
receipt of the income to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income for tax
purposes."); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (emphasizing degree of
control granted attorney over client's cause of action by Alabama attorney's lien statute).
14. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 401-03 (quoting portions of Kenseth's contingency fee
agreement, which gave broad control to attorneys and restricted Kenseth's ability to settle his
case without his attorneys' consent).
15. See F.B. MAcKiNNON,CoNGENTFEESFORLEGALSERVICES 18(1964) (describing
contingency fee agreements).
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tiating, and, if necessary, going to trial.,6 Upon the successful completion of
legal action, an attorney's lien inunediately controls the disbursement of the
recovery to insure the attorney's compensation. 7 This shift in control often
obscures the fact that it is the client's underlying claim and rights that are to
be vindicated with the assistance of counsel.'a In contingency fee cases, with
control over the claim constantly flowing to the attorney, none of the previ-
ously suggested analogies answer all the federal income tax and ethical ques-
tions arising from contingency fee-based representation. 9
However, in a recent case heard by the United States Tax Court, Judge
Renato Beghe offered a new analogy as the solution to the problem.2° In his
dissent in Kenseth v. Commissioner,21 Judge Beghe suggested that the attorney-
client relationship be analogized to sharecropping. 22 Sharecropping is an
16. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,424 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Kenseth's attorneys "made all strategic and tactical decisions in the management" of Kenseth's
claim), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
17. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-61 (1975) (giving attorney lien until client's debt to
attorney is discharged); ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.430 (Michie 1995) (noting that "attorney has a
lien for compensation"); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. 0cc. & PROF. § 10-501 (2000) (giving attorney
lien on client's claim or award if client owes legal fee or compensation); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 484.130 (West 1987) (allowing attorney automatic lien on client's cause of action); Wis.
STAT. ANq. § 757.36 (West 2001) (allowing attorney to place lien on recovery "as security for
fees in the conduct of the litigation").
18. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 443 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining that Kenseth's claims
originate from his "constitutionally or statutorily protected status" and not from any bargain
with his attorneys).
19. See id. at 413 (rejecting joint venture or partnership characterization); id. at 453-54
(Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting possibility that "partnership or joint venture characterization
would open the door to tax avoidance by attorneys"); id. at 454 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (stating
that local bar rules may prohibit partnership or joint venture characterization of attorey-client
relationship); id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (calling for "exploring the consequences of other
arrangements that don't amount to partnerships or joint ventures and yet result in the division
of the proceeds or income from an activity"); id. at 456-57 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining
that refusing to treat attorneys and clients as partners assures that attorney's fee "retains its
character as compensation ordinary income").
20. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 454-55 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (suggesting analogy of share-
cropping to characterize attorney-client relationships involving contingency fees); see also
Lauren E. Sheridan, Note, Trees in the Orchard or Fruit From the Trees?: The Case for Ex-
cludingAttorneys'Contingent Fees From the Client's Gross Income, 36 GA. L. REV. 283,307-
09 (2001) (noting applicability of sharecropping analogy to taxation of contingency fees).
21. 114 T.C. 399 (2000).
22. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,417 (2000) (concluding that Kenseth's gross
income includes portion of settlement for age discrimination paid to attorneys under contin-
gency fee agreement), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). In Kenseth, the court considered the
issue of whether a client bears the tax liability for contingency fees paid out of the client's
recovery to the client's attorneys. Id. at 400. Kenseth alleged that his former employer prac-
ticed age discrimination against him by terminating his employment. Id. at 403. Kenseth and
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arrangement between a landlord and a tenant-farmer in which the landlord
rents land to the tenant-farmer for a portion of the crop that the tenant-farmer
returns to the landlord as rent.' This practice calls for a distinct treatment of
income from the arrangement.24 For the landlord, the income is rental income;
for the tenant-farmer, it is farm income.2"
For any analogy to work successfully in this area of law, it must work
with both26 the assignment of income doctrine from federal court decisions
27
sixteen other plaintiffs entered into contingency fee agreements with a law firm in which they
agreed to pay the attorneys 40% of any recovery. Id. at 400-01. The attorneys successfully
recovered a total settlement of $2,650,000. Id. at 404. Kenseth's portion of the recovery was
$229,501.37, and he included only the $32,476.61 allocated to back wages in his income for
the taxable year. Id. at 404-05. The IRS alleged that Kenseth had a tax deficiency. Id. at 405-
06. The majority, after noting the existence of a circuit split on the issue, explained that the case
fell within the doctrine of assignment of income as expressed in O'Brien v. Commissioner, 38
T.C. 707, 712 (1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963). Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 408-12. The
majority also refused to decide the case on the basis of "various States' attorney's lien statutes,"
although it noted that the relevant Wisconsin attorney's lien statute would not support the
plaintiffs argument. Id. at 412, 415-16. The majority further rejected the plaintiff's argument
that he lacked sufficient control over his claim to be taxed on the portion of his recovery paid
to his attorneys. Id. at 414. The court dismissed the reasoning that the speculative nature of the
claim and the reliance on the assistance of counsel placed the contingency fee arrangement
outside of the doctrine of assignment of income. Id. at 410-11,413. The majority concluded
that Kenseth must include in his income the contingency fees paid to his attorneys. Id. at 417.
Judge Chabot dissented, arguing that the assignment of income doctrine is not applicable to the
facts of the case. Id. at 417-21 (Chabot, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Beghe called for
a reevaluation of the federal income tax treatment of recoveries obtained through contingency-
fee-based representation, arguing that attorneys' contingency fees should not be taxable to the
client. Id. at 421-58 (Beghe, J., dissenting). Judge Beghe suggested the sharecropper-landlord
relationship as an appropriate analogy to the contingency fee arrangement between an attorney
and his client. Id. at 454-55 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
23. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (7th ed. 1999) (defining sharecropping as "[a]n
agricultural arrangement in which a landowner leases land and equipment to a tenant who, in
turn, gives the landlord a portion of the crop as rent").
24. See Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d 623, 624-25 (7th Cir.
1993) (concluding that landowner's share of crops under sharecropping contract is rental
income); Trust U/W Oblinger v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 114, 123 (1993) (holding that landlord's
shares of crop are rental income); IRS Publication 225, Farmer's Tax Guide 15-16, 84 (2001)
(providing that landlord's shares of crop are generally rental income but are farm income if land-
lord materially participates in farming operation).
25. IRS Publication 225, Farmer's Tax Guide 16-17 (2001).
26. See generally Stephen D. Feldman, Comment, Exclusion of Contingent Attorneys'
Fees from Gross Income, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1309 (2001) (discussing impact of assignment of
income doctrine and state law of attorney's liens on taxation of contingency fees).
27. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940) (interpreting assignment of
income doctrine to mean "that income is 'realized' by the assignor because he, who owns or
controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have
received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the
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and the state law doctrine of attorney's liens on recoveries." These two
theories of attribution pull courts in one of two directions. If a court follows
the state law route concerning an attorney's lien, the result guarantees a lack
of uniformity across the nation.29 If the court instead utilizes the assignment
of income doctrine and requires clients to include contingency fees in their
gross income, the tax consequences for the client can effectively deprive the
client of any economic redress obtained through the lawsuit." Equally
frustrating to clients, courts disagree as to whether the assignment of income
doctrine is even applicable to the taxation of contingency fees. 1
satisfaction of his wants"y, Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (developing assignment
of income doctrine by refusing to allow "anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skillfully devised" to permit taxpayer to avoid income tax consequences for income he earned but
assigned to another); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying
implicitly doctrine of assignment of income from Horst and Earl to conclude that portion of
recovery paid to attorney as contingency fee is gross income to client). But see Cotnam v.
Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1959) (concluding that "[assignment of income]
doctrine can have no just or realistic application to a case like this, where the only economic
benefit to the taxpayer was as an aid to the collection of a part of an otherwise worthless claim").
28. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856-57 (6th
Cir. 2000) (explaining that Michigan attorney's liens grant attorneys ownership interests in part
of their clients' recoveries, making contingency fee gross income to attorney alone); Cotnam,
263 F.2d at 125 (concluding that Alabama's attorney's lien statute grants attorneys ownership
interests in their clients' recoveries, allowing clients to exclude contingency fees from their gross
income); Dreiband v. Candler, 131 N.W. 129, 129 (Mich. 1911) (explaining that common law
attorney's lien operates to assign portion of "the fruit of the litigation" to attorney).
29. Compare Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856-57 (relying on Michigan attorney's lien
law in finding that contingency fee is not part of client's gross income), and Cotnam, 263 F.2d
at 125 (concluding that Alabama attorney's lien statute prevents contingency fees from being
gross income to client), with Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that
North Carolina common law attorney's lien permits contingency fee to be included as gross
income for client), Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding
that California attorney's lien law does not require exclusion of contingency fee from client's
gross income), cerL denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001), Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190-91
(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because Alaska attorney's lien law does not confer any property
interest in client's recovery on attorney, contingency fee is includible in client's gross income),
cert denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001), and Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (concluding that Maryland
attorney's lien statute allows contingency fees to be gross income to client). But see infra notes
144-54 and accompanying text (noting states in which attorney's lien laws give attorneys no
equitable interest in clients' recoveries).
30. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 419 (2000) (Chabot, J., dissenting) (arguing
that application of assignment of income doctrine to contingency fees "can raise effective tax
ratesto hardship levels" under AMT), af'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); id. at 425-26 (Beghe,
J., dissenting) (explaining how mechanics of itemized deduction rules and AMT can result in
effective tax rates in excess of 100% of clients' net recoveries); Sager & Cohen, supra note 4,
at 1076-78 (explaining how income tax law and AMT can significantly reduce plaintiff's
recovery); supra note 4 (explaining AMT's effect on tax consequences of contingency fees).
31. Compare Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58 (finding assignment of income doctrine
inapplicable), and Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959) (same), with Coady
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This Note will show how the sharecropping analogy not only properly
characterizes the attorney-client relationship but also handles both theories of
attribution used by courts to address the tax questions surrounding contin-
gency fees. It will argue that contingency fees are not gross income to clients,
but are solely the income of the attorney who earned them. Part II will discuss
the Kenseth majority opinion, focusing particularly on its factual circum-
stances and the court's reasoning.32 Part III will analyze the two theories of
attribution utilized by courts in determining a successful plaintiff's tax liabil-
ity for contingency fees.3 Part IV will examine the cases that preceded Ken-
seth and caused the current circuit split. 4 Part V will analyze the sharecrop-
ping analogy suggested in Judge Beghe's dissenting opinion in Kenseth3
Part VI will draw conclusions and offer recommendations for future contin-
gency fee cases.36
I. Kenseth v. Commissioner
In March of 1991, APV Crepaco (APV) terminated the employment of
Eldon R. Kenseth, a forty-five year-old master scheduler who had worked at
APV for twenty-one years. Kenseth, who was earning $33,480 per year at
the time of his discharge, filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of
Industry, Labor, and Human Relations alleging that APV engaged in age dis-
crimination when it terminated his employment.3  Kenseth and sixteen other
former APV employees retained the law firm of Fox & Fox, S.C., to seek
damages from APV 9 The employees all signed contingency agreements with
Fox & Fox, agreeing to allocate 40% of any recovery to the firm. 0 Fox & Fox
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin alleging that APV deprived the class members of their rights
v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding assignment of income doctrine
applicable to contingency fees), cer. denied, 532 U.S. 972(2001), andBaylin, 43 F.3d at 1454-
55 (same).
32. See infra Part U (discussing mjority opinion in Kenseth).
33. See infra Part M11 (discussing assignment of income doctrine and state attorney's lien
laws).
34. See infra Part IV (explaining and analyzing cases involved in circuit split).
35. See infra Part V (discussing sharecropping analogy as method to characterize attor-
ney-client relationship in contingency fee cases).
36. See infra Part VI (noting conclusions and recommendations for future contingency
fee taxation cases).
37. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,400 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 401-02.
TAX TREATMENT OF CONTINGENCY FEES
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).4' The
plaintiffs sought back pay, liquidated damages, reinstatement (or front pay in
lieu of reinstatement), and attorney's fees and costs.42
After negotiations, Fox & Fox eventually reached an agreement with
APV, in which APV agreed to pay the plaintiffs $2,650,000." The settlement
included $1,590,000 for the plaintiffi and a $1,060,000 fee for Fox & Fox."
Kenseth's share of the gross settlement was $229,501.37."s APV paid
$32,476.61 of the settlement directly to Kenseth as lost wages, which after
taxes amounted to a net of $21,246.20.' The settlement agreement designated
the remaining $197,024.76 of Kenseth's portion as a recovery "for personal
injury damages which the parties intend as those types of damages excludable
from income under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code as dam-
ages for personal injuries."47 After deducting its attorney's fees, Fox & Fox
issued Kenseth a check in the amount of $105,724.22.48 Kenseth included
only the part of the settlement allotted to back pay on his 1993 federal income
tax return. 49 Furthermore, Kenseth did not claim any deductions for any of his
legal fees.5"
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice of deficiency to
Kenseth regarding his 1993 return.5 The notice adjusted Kenseth's gross
income by including the $197,024.76 not allocated to lost wages. 2 This
amount included the contingency fee paid to Fox & Fox." The deficiency
notice allowed a miscellaneous itemized deduction of $91,800 for the contin-
gency fee. 4 However, pursuant to § 67 of the Internal Revenue Code and the
overall limitation on itemized deductions under § 68, the IRS reduced the
41. Id. at 403-04; see aso Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 621-634
(1994) (outlawing workplace discrimination based on age).





47. Id. at 404-05; see also I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (West Supp. 2001) (excluding from gross
income damages received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness"). But
see Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995) (finding that recoveries under ADEA are not
excludable from plaintiff's gross income).
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deduction for the fees by $9,992."5 Yet, with the AMT's disallowance of mis-
cellaneous itemized deductions, Kenseth lost his deduction for legal fees and
had a deficiency of $17,198 arising from his recovery from APV."6 Kenseth's
total alleged tax deficiency was $55,037.1'
Kenseth challenged the IRS's determination that his gross income
included the contingency fee paid to his attorney.' The outcome of Kenseth's
challenge would have a major impact on the scope of his recovery, especially
given the impact of the AMT. 9 The majority, although recognizing the
possible unfairness resulting from the AMT, noted that redrafting the law to
address such iniquities is the province of Congress, not the Tax Court.60
The majority looked to both the assignment of income doctrine and to
Wisconsin's attorney's lien statute to reach its decision. 6' The court concluded
that "contingent fee agreements... come within the ambit of the assignment
of income doctrine and do not serve... to exclude the fee from the [client's]
gross income. "62 According to the majority, Kenseth earned all of his recovery,
55. Id. at 405-06. For Kenseth's tax purposes, § 67 reduced the amount of legal fees that
he could deduct by $5,298. Id. at 405. Section 68 further reduced the amount of legal fees that
he could deduct by $4,694. Id. at 406; see also I.R.C. § 67 (1994) (permitting miscellaneous
itemized deductions only to extent such deductions exceed 2% of taxpayer's adjusted gross
income); I.R.C. § 68 (1994) (placing cap on taxpayer's overall amount of itemized deductions).
56. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,406 (2000), aqOd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001);
see I.R.C. § 56(bX1XAXi) (1994) (eliminating miscellaneous itemized deductions in calculating
AMT); see also Sager &-Cohen, supra note 4, at 1077-78 (noting dramatic increase in clients'
tax liabilities under AMT if they are forced to include contingency fees in their gross income);
supra note 4 (discussing mechanics of AMT).
57. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 406.
58. Id. at 406-07. Kenseth conceded that the proceeds from the settlement were not
excludable under § 104(aX2) of the Internal Revenue Code because the payment was not for
physical injury. Id. at 406; see also I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (West Supp. 2000) (excluding from gross
income damages received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness"). Prior
to the 1996 amendment altering § 104(aX2) to limit the exclusion from gross income to
damages paid for "physical injury or physical sickness," the Supreme Court found that "a
recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income." Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S.
323,327 (1995).
59. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407 (noting "substantial difference in the amount of tax
burden that may result from the [two] parties' approaches"). Including the contingency fee in
Kenseth's gross income and assuming his full payment of the $55,037 tax deficiency, Kenseth
received only roughly 31%, or $71,433.42, of his $229,501.37 recovery. See id. at 404-06
(noting amounts). The remaining 69%, or $158,067.95, went to pay taxes, including the AMT,
and his attorneys. Id.
60. Id. at 407.
61. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 412,415-16 (using assignment of income doctrine to deter-
mine tax consequences of contingency fees and noting that Wisconsin attorney's lien statute
supports majority's conclusion).
62. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 412 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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and his attorney simply helped him collect the damages.63 Furthermore, the
majority rejected Kenseth's assertions that he lacked sufficient control over his
claim and recovery.' In Wisconsin, an attorney cannot obtain an ownership
interest in the client's claim or recovery that would allow the attorney to take
control of the case away from the client.6" Despite this conclusion, the majority
refused to base its decision about the federal income tax consequences of a
contingency fee on a state statute." For all these reasons, the court concluded
that the entire amount of Kenseth's award, including the contingency fee, was
gross income to Kenseth.67 As shall be shown, many of these conclusions are
not as certain as they may appear.6 Kenseth was not always in a position to be
in complete control of his lawsuit and recovery, especially in view of the
doctrine of assignment of income and state attorney's lien statutes.69 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard
Posner, writing for the majority, affirmed the Tax Court's decision. 0
III. The Conflicting Doctrines
To best understand the cases involving the taxation of contingency fees,
one must have a firm grasp on two theories of apportionment. The first is the
assignment of income doctrine.". The second is the analysis of attorney's
63. Id. at 413.
64. Id. at 414.
65. Id. at414-16.
66. Id. at412.
67. Id. at 417.
68. See infra notes 261-86 and accompanying text (discussing Kenseth's relative control
over his case).
69. See infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text (noting dissent's application of assign-
ment of income doctrine and state attorney's lien statutes to facts of Kenseth).
70. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming Tax Court's
decision). The Seventh Circuit based its decision on this analogy:
If a taxpayer obtains income of $100 at a cost in generating that income of $25, he
has gross income of $100 and a deduction of $25, yielding taxable income of $75;
he does not have gross income of S75. If, therefore, for some reason the cost of
generating the income is not deductible, he has taxable income of $100.
Id. at 883 (citations omitted). Under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, if the AMT causes the
taxpayer to lose his or her deduction, it is not for the courts to rectify. Id. at 885. The tax code
provisions causing this discrepancy are for the Congress to deal with, not the courts. Id. at 885.
The court found that the contingency fee agreement was neither an assignment of a portion of
the claim to the attorney nor a property interest of the attorney via Wisconsin's attorney's lien
law. Id. at 883-84. The Seventh Circuit firmly sided with the Tax Court, calling its interpreta-
tion "clearly correct," and stated that cases "reject[ing] the Tax Court's position seem based on
little more than sympathy for taxpayers." Id. at 883, 885.
71. See infra notes 79-127 and accompanying text (discussing assignment of income
doctrine).
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liens under state law to determine if the attorney obtains an ownership interest
in the contingency fee." While the term "doctrine" is often associated with
assignment of income, it is better to think of the assignment of income princi-
ples, as well as state attorney's lien statutes, as control devices.73 They
establish the boundaries of control over the underlying legal claim and the
contingency fee.74 If, under either theory, the attorney gains a sufficient
degree of control over the fee, the fee becomes gross income to the attorney
alone." Absent that necessary level of control, the fee is gross income to the
client as well as to the attorney.76 The difficulty is in determining the level of
control involved." The historical development of each theory helps to explain
this difficulty.7 Each theory will be examined in turn.
A. Assignment of Income Doctrine
The Supreme Court first explained the doctrine of assignment of income
in Lucas v. Earl,79 in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. described the
doctrine with the famous, yet eventually troubling, metaphor of an improper
transfer of fruit (income) between two parties."0 In 1901, Earl entered into a
72. See infta notes 128-54 and accompanying text (describing analysis of attorney's liens
from various states).
73. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rives & Brown, JJ.,
concurring) (referring to assignment of income as "doctrine"); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
399, 427 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (mentioning "assignment of income doctrine"), aff'd,
259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
74. Cf Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 432 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that control over
contingency fee by either client or attorney should determine tax liability for contingency fee).
75. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 (noting that Alabama attorney's lien statute gave Cot-
nam's attorney sufficient control over Cotnam's claim and recovery, allowing Cotnam not to
realize gross income from contingency fees); id. at 125-26 (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring)
(arguing assignment of income doctrine does not shift tax liability for contingency fee to Cot-
nar1).
76. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying
assignment of income doctrine to give client control over contingency fee and making fee gross
income to client); id. at 1455 (explaining that Maryland attorney's lien statute does not confer
ownership over claim or fee to attorney, causing client to have gross income to extent of
contingency fee).
77. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining that purpose of his
dissent was to demonstrate that Kenseth lacked sufficient control over his claim and recovery
to be required to include contingency fees in his gross income).
78. See infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text (noting historical development of
assignment of income doctrine); infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (noting historical
reasons for development of attorney's lien statutes).
79. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
80. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (concluding that Earl's contract with
his wife to divide his income evenly between them did not allow Earl to escape payment of
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contract with his wife in which they agreed that they would own any property
that either of them acquired as joint tenants with a right of survivorship."'
Because of this contract, Earl asserted that he should only be taxed on one-half
of his salary for the years 1920 and 1921 ' He argued that the contract speci-
fied that his salary immediately became marital joint property at the moment
he earned it. 3 The Court rejected this approach and refused to decide the case
on the picayune details of the voluntary contract between Earl and his wife.!4
federal income tax for his entire income). In Earl, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
Earl's federal income tax liability on income he earned while he had a contract apportioning that
income evenly between his wife and himself. Id. at 113. In 1901, Earl and his wife entered into
a contract stating:
[T]hat any property either of us now has or may hereafter acquire... in any way,
either by earnings (including salaries, fees, etc.), or any rights by contract or
otherwise, during the existence of our marriage, or which we or either of us may
receive by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, and all the proceeds, issues, and
profits of any and all such property shall be treated and considered, and hereby is
declared to be received, held, taken, and owned by us as joint tenants, and not
otherwise, with the right of survivorship.
Id. at 113-14. The Court did not question the validity of the contract. Id. at 114. Earl offered
a "forcible argument" that the statute only taxes income that is "beneficially received" by one
person. Id. Earl's argument hinged on the fact that technically his salary became the joint
property of his wife and himself from the moment it was received. Id. The Court rejected this
analysis with language that would resonate in future cases by saying that "this case is not to be
decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of the
taxing act." Id. The Court rejected the idea that an "anticipatory arrangement" could be used
to prevent Earl from owing tax on his salary because his agreement with his wife prevented his
salary from ever being his own property. Id. at 114-15. The Court likened this arrangement by
Earl as one "by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."
Id. at 115; see also Ernest J. Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 13 U.S. CAL.
TAX INST. 1, 15 (1961) (arguing that Holmes's decision to use metaphor to explain assignment
of income doctrine added to difficulties of later courts tackling similar issues); Sheridan, supra
note 20, at 305-09 (discussing metaphors used by courts to describe tax treatment of assignment
of income doctrine and contingency fees).
81. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 113-14 (noting contract provisions between Earl and wife).
82. Id. at 113.
83. See Earl v. Comm'r, 30 F.2d 898, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1929) (noting issue of whether
interval passed between moment Earl earned his salary and moment it became joint property of
Earl and his wife), rev 'd sub nom., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930).
84. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 114 (refusing to decide case on "attenuated subtleties" of Earl's
contract with his wife). The Court's ultimate decision had a great deal to do with the question
of who was going to be taxed. See MARVIN A. CHIRXLSTEIN, FEDERAL INCoMIE TAXATION
§ 8.01(a), at 195 (rev. 8th ed. 1999) (discussing decision in Earl). The government feared that,
if Earl had succeeded with his plan, such a result would undermine the progressive rate structure
of the federal income tax. Id. at 196. By voluntarily splitting his income between his wife and
himself, both would be responsible for income tax at lower marginal rates. When the Court
found for the government, Earl was forced to pay taxes on his entire income at a higher marginal
rate. As Chirelstein notes, "minor children and perhaps other family dependents could be made
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Justice Holmes instead stated that the decision in the case should be based on
the "import and reasonable construction of the taxing act." 5 The "reasonable
construction" of the taxing law applied by the Court is that those who earned
the income owe the tax on it. 6 According to the Court, taxpayers cannot avoid
the tax with clever, pre-arranged contracts that prevent the ownership of the
salary from ever completely vesting in the one who earned it, even for one
second. 7 Earl, despite his efforts to assign his income to his wife, was liable
for the payment of income tax on his entire salary."8 In his famous metaphor,
Holmes likened Earl's contract to an "arrangement by which the fruits are
attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."' 9 '
In Helvering v. Horst," the Supreme Court again commented on the
assignment of income doctrine.9 In Horst, the taxpayer made a gift of the
parties to contracts like Earl's, thus further multiplying the width of the income tax brackets.
Since the great bulk of family income comes from personal services, a government defeat in
Earl would seriously have damaged the entire concept of graduated rates." Id.
85. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114.
86. Id. at 114-15; see also United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441,449 (1973) ("[(lncome
must be taxed to him who earns it." (quoting Comm'r v. Wilbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40
(1949))).
87. Earl, 281 U.S. at 115.
88. Id. at 113, 115.
89. Id. at 115.
90. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
91. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) (concluding donor who gave donee
right to payment of interest from investments held by donor realizes income within doctrine of
Earl). In Horst, the Supreme Court considered the federal income tax consequences to a donor
who gives a donee the right to receive interest payments from an investment held by the donor.
Id. at 114. Horst owned negotiable bonds, and in the years 1934 and 1935 he removed the
interest coupons from the bonds prior to the maturity date on the bonds and gave the coupons to
his son as a gift. Id. Horst's son collected the interest at the time of the maturity of the bonds.
Id. The IRS argued that the interest paid to the son was gross income to Horst. Id. The court
stated that a bondholder holds "two independent and separable kinds of rights." Id. at 115. One
is the right to receive payment for the principal amount of the bond at maturity, and the other is
the right to receive payment of the interest at times specified by the bond agreement. Id. The
Court explained that the revenue laws of the United States have been interpreted as making the
realization of income the event that triggers the tax as opposed to the moment when the potential
taxpayer acquires the right to receive income. Id. However, the Court noted that the revenue
laws do not allow a taxpayer, who has enjoyed the economic benefit of his income, to escape
taxation on that income because the taxpayer has not actually received the income. Id. at 116.
The economic benefit of income includes the right to make dispositions of that income in a
manner that satisfies the taxpayer. Id. Applying the assignment of income doctrine, the Court
concluded that Horst could not escape taxation on the income from the interest coupons simply
by giving it away to his son. Id. at 119-20. Despite never actually realizing the income, Horst
was able to control its disposition, and the Court equated this to the actual ownership of such
income. Id. at 118. Thus, the Court reasoned that the tax laws will not allow the distinctions
drawn by the donor as to how he will use his income let the donor escape tax liabilities. Id. at
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interest coupons on negotiable bonds to his son just prior to the maturity date
of the bonds.' Upon the maturity date, the son collected the interest and later
included it as part of his gross income. 3 The Court found that such an assign-
ment of the right to receive interest income from the bonds did not allow
Horst to escape federal income tax for the interest income.94 Had Horst been
allowed to follow through with his plan, he would have controlled the disposi-
tion of the income without suffering any federal income tax consequences.9"
The Court ruled that Horst was liable for the tax on the interest income
regardless of whether he used it for his own purposes or gave it to his son.'
Horst attempted to argue that this scenario was outside of the parameters
of Earl because Horst's assignment of the income rights in the interest cou-
pons preceded the actual event - the maturity date of the bonds - that trig-
gered the income in question.' In contrast, Earl had to perform additional
services, beyond his contract to split his income with his wife, to obtain his
salary.' Thus, the income technically vested immediately in Earl at the very
moment he earned it." The Horst Court rejected such a distinction based on
119-20. This is especially true when the donor still enjoyed the benefits of the income by being
able to make a gift of it. Id. Horst was liable for the income tax on the interest, for the Court
stated that, in the vein of Lucas v. Earl, such an interpretation as advocated by Horst would have
the fruit (income) "attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew." Id. at 120.
92. Id. at 114.
93. Id. at 114; id. at 121 (McReynolds, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 120.
95. See id. at 116-17 (noting that "the rule that income is not taxable until realized has
never been taken to mean that' the taxpayer, .. who... enjoyed the benefit of the economic
gain represented by his right to receive income, can escape taxation because he has not himself
received payment of it from his obligor").
96. Id. at 116-17.
97. See id. at 119-20 (stating that Horst's agreement occurred prior to maturity date of
bonds that triggered interest income, preventing that income from ever vesting in Horst).
98. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930) (noting that contract between Earl and
his wife only took effect on income acquired at time of contract formation or at any time
afterwards). The distinction that Horst attempted to draw between his case and Earl depends
on the nature of the income involved. A salary is payment for services performed. In Earl, the
assignment of income to his wife occurred prior to Earl performing the services necessary to
earn his salary. Id. at 113-14. Earl had to work to earn his salary, allowing the salary to vest
in him at least briefly before passing to his wife. See Helveringv. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119-20
(1940) (discussing distinction between Earl and Horst). In contrast, Horst, as a holder of
interest bearing coupons, had done everything necessary to be entitled to the interest income.
See id. (explaining that "the right of the assignor to receive the income antedated the assignment
which transferred the right and thus precluded such an instantaneous vesting" as was found in
Earl). With the transfer of the coupons to his son, the interest income would not vest in Horst,
even for a moment. Id.
99. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 119-20 .(noting difference in timing of transactions in Horst
and Earl); see also Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15 (showing that timeline involved in transfers
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the facts of Earl as just the sort of "attenuated subtleties" that the court and
the tax laws sought to avoid."t° No "anticipatory arrangements... however
skillfully devised" allowed Horst to escape taxation on the interest earned by
the coupons.01 Seizing on Holmes's metaphor in Earl, the Horst Court noted
that the "import of the statute is that the fruit is not to be attributed to a dif-
ferent tree from that on which it grew."'"
These two cases formed the backbone of the assignment of income doc-
trine. 03 Under the doctrine, a party cannot divert a portion of his income to
other recipients, such as creditors, and escape taxation on that income. t"
Despite being a prominent doctrine, the facts upon which the assignment of
income doctrine was built have raised questions as to the doctrine's ultimate
usefulness in dealing with the taxation of contingency fees. °5 Both Earl and
Horst involved intra-family donative transfers."0 6 In both cases, the Court
utilized the doctrine to prevent tax avoidance.""° The income in question in
each case was both certain and secure." e Finally, in each case, the donor's
control over the income was complete and never in doubt." Either Earl or
Horst could have retained the income for his own use if he so desired." 0
required Earl to perform additional work after making contract with his wife, allowing income
to vest in him for at least briefest of moments).
100. Horst,311 U.S. at 120.
101. Id.(quotingLucasv. Earl,281 U.S. 111,115(1930)).
102. Id. at 120.
103. See id. at 115-20 (1940) (applying assignment of income doctrine); Earl, 281 U.S.
at 114-15 (establishing assignment of income doctrine).
104. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) (noting assignment of income
doctrine prevents avoidance of federal income tax by shifting income to other parties).
105. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 411 n.5 (2000) (describing assignment
of income doctrine as "well-established"), a.rfd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Estate
of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000) (distin-
guishing Earl and Horst and refusing to apply assignment of income doctrine to contingency
fees).
106. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (stating that transfer of interest coupons was from father
to son); Earl, 281 U.S. at 113 (noting contract was between Earl and his wife).
107. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S 111, 114 (1930); see also Horst, 311 U.S. at 120 (utilizing
doctrine of Earl to prevent tax avoidance by Horst's plan to shift interest coupons to his son).
I08. Compare Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (noting that Horst's bonds did pay interest at
maturity), and Earl, 281 U.S. at 113 (noting that income in question was Earl's salary), with
Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857 (noting speculative nature of recovery at time Clarks hired
attorney on contingency fee basis).
109. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (noting Horst's complete ownership of negotiable bonds
prior to transferring interest coupons from bonds to his son); Earl, 281 U.S. at 113 (noting that
Earl alone earned his salary).
110. Cf. supra note 98 (noting Horst gave interest coupons to his son). For example, if
Horst wished to retain the interest income from the coupons, he simply would not have trans-
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Furthermore, a strict statutory construction was not the primary basis for
the doctrine. 1' Because of Justice Holmes's reliance on a loose construction
of the tax laws, the doctrine developed as a federal common law doctrine. 2
In that vein, the Earl decision may have been based more on outside consider-
ations than a strict reading of the tax code.1 3
The Supreme Court may have established the assignment of income
doctrine in Lucas v. Earl to preserve the progressive rate structure of the fed-
eral income taX.114 The tax years at issue in the case were 1920 and 1921.'"
At that time, the constitutional authority for a federal income tax was only
seven years old." 6 The government saw Earl's contract with his wife as a
direct challenge to the progressive rate structure of the income tax."' The
Earls actually entered into the contract in 1901, well before both the ratifica-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment and the passage ofthe Internal Revenue Act
of 1918.118 The Earls argued that their contract was valid under California law
and that the Revenue Act only taxed income that Earl directly received solely
for his benefit." 9 As a result, the Supreme Court faced the option of either
holding for the Earls and effectively defeating the graduated income tax rate
system, or finding for the govermnent and preserving the graduated rates
despite the Earls' legal contract.'2 The Court made the judicial choice to
uphold the progressive statutory rates.' 2'
ferred them to his son. Earl would have had to breach his contract with his wife in order to keep
his income. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 113 (noting contract between Earl and wife).
111. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 115 (noting that "import of the [tax) statute" was basis for
assignment of income doctrine).
112. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,427 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting)(emphasiz-
ing that assignment of income doctrine is "judge-made" and not based on strict statutory
construction), affrd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
113. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (focusing on possible motives for
decision in Earl).
114. See Brown, supra note 80, at 13 (noting choice made by Supreme Court to preserve
graduated income tax rate structure).
115. Lucas v. Earl,281 U.S. 111, 113 (1930).
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (noting ratification in 1913).
117. Brown, supra note 80, at 13 (explaining that government saw Earl's contract "as a
threat to the statutory scheme of graduated [income tax] rates").
118. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113 (1930) (noting date of contract); see also Act
of Feb. 24, 1919, 40 Stat. 1057 (noting date of passage). The government accused Earl of
violating this revenue law. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114.
119. See Earl, 281 U.S. at 114 (noting Earl's argument that income tax only taxes income
"beneficially received"), Brown, supra note 80, at 13 (noting Ead's reliance on California law).
120. See Brown, supra note 80, at 13 (explaining choice facing Supreme Court).
121. Id.; see also CHiRETEN, supra note 84, at 196 (noting that government's victory in
Earl prevented "the taxpayer from effectively reducing the applicable rate of tax by splitting his
salary income with his wife").
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The Earl decision and the use of the "fruit of the tree" analogy opened
the door for more tax decisions to be decided on common law doctrines as
opposed to the tax statutes alone."2 Judges, not always experts in the intrica-
cies of the tax statutes, often fell back on common law ideas, especially
property concepts, to validate a transfer of income and avoid the assignment
of income doctrine."
The common law background of the assignment of income doctrine
opens the door for current courts to alter or amend the doctrine as circum-
stances warrant."2 4 If there is a change in circumstances, such as the increas-
ing hardship imposed on clients by the AMT, the courts can alter the assign-
ment of income doctrine. 21 When courts factor the client's true level of
control over his case into the assignment of income doctrine, altering the.
common law doctrine may not be enough." 6 Where a lawyer's control over
a client's lawsuit supersedes the client's level of control over his own case,
the assignment of income doctrine should not even apply. 27
B. Attorney's Liens Under State Law
The second theory of attribution used in contingency fee tax cases is the
state law of attorney's liens. In some states, attorney's liens act as a control-
122. See Brown, supra note 80, at 15-17 (explaining courts' reliance on common law
doctrines to decide tax issues). Brown's argument suggests that once a court found a common
law rationale, such as a property concept for allowing a taxpayer to shift income to another
party, the court could then use this common law rationale to shift income while staying within
the doctrine of assignment of income as found in Lucas v. Earl. Id.; see also Lum v. Comm'r,
147 F.2d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 1945) (finding taxpayer liable for income tax on rents assigned to
wife but finding wife liable for income tax on rental income coming from property which
taxpayer transferred "rights as 'landlord'" to his wife).
123. See Brown, supra note 80, at 15 (noting that courts often searched for "a property
concept which could constitute a tree capable of being transplanted. If they could discover an
income-producing property 'tree' capable of being transplanted and which had been transplanted
or transferred, then the deflection [of income from the assignor to the assignee] was successful.").
124. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,427 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that
judges "need not wait for Congress" to alter application of assignment of income doctrine),
aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
125. Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "what the courts have created and
applied, courts can interpret, refine, and distinguish to determine whether in changed circum-
stances the conditions for application of the doctrine have been satisfied").
126. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (discussing level of control issue); id. at 430-31 (Beghe,
J., dissenting) (asking whether client's control over his lawsuit is sufficient to include contin-
gency fees in client's gross income).
127. See id. at 446 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that contingency fee agreement reduced
Kenseth's control over his lawsuit, making assignment of income doctrine inapplicable). Judge
Beghe's dissent also stated that other factors found in Earl and Horst were not present in
Kenseth, namely that "the contingent fee agreement... was not an intrafamily donative transac-
tion and did not occur within an economic group of related parties." Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting).
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shifting device, transferring powerful rights of control over a client's lawsuit
to the client's attorney.12s In other states, the lien fails to transfer these inter-
ests. ' 9 These liens originated at common law to insure compensation to the
attorney for services provided to the client. 3° The lien operates by allowing
attorneys to obtain their legal fees and costs from the funds recovered through
the legal action, and the lien also permits the attorney to postpone distribution
of any part of the recovery to the client until the attorney is paid.' 31 An attor-
ney's lien is often a part of a contingency fee contract that a client signs in
order to hire an attorney.13 2 For the client, the attorney's lien, when coupled
with other language in a standard contingency fee form contract, works to
shift a large degree of control over the case to the attorney.1 33  With the
codification of attorney's liens in state statutes, an attorney's control over her
client's case has become absolute in some states.
34
128. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (noting that Alabama
attorney's lien statute grants "[attorneys... the same rights as their clients" as to control over
client's lawsuit and recovery).
129. See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (discussing states with attorney's liens
that do not transfer strong control rights over client's claims and recoveries to attorneys).
130. See Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649,651 (N.Y. 1889) (explaining that attorney's
liens originated to "protect ... attorneys from the knavery of their clients"). See Thad Austin
Davis, Comment, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment of Contingency-
BasedAttorneys'Fees - The Alabama Attorney's Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-On,
51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1688-1700 (2000), for a detailed analysis and discussion of state
attorney's lien statutes and the tax repercussions of such liens on contingency fees.
131. See Davis, supra note 130, at 1688-89 (noting general operation of attorney's lien).
132. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 400-03 (2000) (explaining that contract for
contingency fee representation was form contract containing attorney's lien provision), affd,
259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). The language explaining the lien in Kenseth states that the
"attorney shall have a lien against any damages, proceeds, costs and fees recovered in the
client's action for the fees and costs due the attorney under this agreement and said lien shall
be satisfied before or concurrent with the dispersal of any such proceeds and fees." Id. at 402.
133. See id. at 401-02 (noting provisions restricting client's ability to settle without
attorneys' consent and placing attorney's lien on all fees due attorneys if client opts to change
attorneys); id. at 443-45 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining effects of attorney's lien and other
contract provisions on Kenseth's ability to control destination of his case). Contingency fee
contracts often amount to adhesion contracts. Such contracts are defined as a "standard-form
contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a
consumer, who has little choice about the terms." Id. at 444 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DIcTONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999)).
134. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (construing Alabama
attorney's lien statute to grant attorney same rights and control over client's claims as client
possesses); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Levy, 77 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1935) (construing Ala-
bama attorney's lien statute to grant attorney "an equitable assignment (or) equitable lien" in
plaintiff's cause of action); Denson v. Ala. Fuel & Iron Co., 73 So. 525, 528-31 (Ala. 1916)
(explaining extent of attorney's rights under Alabama attorney's lien statute); W. .Ry. Co. v.
Foshee, 62 So. 500, 503-04 (Ala. 1913) (explaining attorney's right under Alabama attorney's
lien statute to prosecute his client's suit to final judgment even after client has settled); see also
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For example, Alabama's attorney's lien statute grants sweeping and
atypical rights of control over the client's lawsuit to the client's attorney.13
The current Alabama statute states:
(b) Upon actions and judgments for money, [attorneys] shall have a lien
superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy
said action or judgment, until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees
is fully satisfied; and attorneys-at-law shall have the same right and power
over action or judgment to enforce their liens as their clients had or may
have for the amount due thereon to them. I
Under this statute, an attorney has an ownership interest in the client's recov-
ery and identical rights of control as the client has over the prosecution of the
claim.'37 If a contingency fee contract grants an attorney rights similar to
those granted by the Alabama statute, those rights prevent the contingency fee
from vesting in the client, and the client has no gross income from the contin-
gency fee. 3 The attorney's lien shifts control and ownership of the fee from
the client to the attorney.1 39  As with assignment of income, tax liability
follows those who control the income. 40 Thus, the presence of a strong
attorney's lien is a key factor that courts have used to conclude that clients do
not have gross income from contingency fees. 4'
Conversely, courts have viewed the absence of a strong attorney's lien
statute as a major factor in cases determining that contingency fees are gross
income to clients.'42 In these cases, the statutory lien does not shift control
Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that Michigan common law attorney's lien "operates in more or less the same way
as the Alabama lien in Cotnam").
135. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 435 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting "unusual" characteristics
of Alabama's attorney's lien law and their contribution to Colnam's result).
136. ALA. CODE § 34-3-61(b) (1975).
137.. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 435 (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263
F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (construing Alabama's attorney's lien statute to give attorneys
"the same rights as their clients" over clients' lawsuits and recoveries).
138. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th
Cir. 2000) (explaining Cotnam holding and that "Michigan law is not inconsistent with [Ala-
bama's] view of the attorney's lien").
139. See Cotam, 263 F.2d at 125 (noting that attorney's rights become equivalent to
client's under lien).
140. See id. at 125-26 (concluding that because Alabama attorney's lien statute transfers
control over taxpayer's claim and contingency fee to her attorney, her attorney alone should
bear tax liabilities for contingency fees).
141. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856 (relying on strength of interests granted to
attorneys under Michigan common law attorney's lien); Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 (noting
emphasis on equitable interests granted to attorneys under Alabama attorney's lien statute).
142. See, e.g., Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Under
California law, an attorney lien does not confer any ownership interest upon attorneys or grant
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from the client to the attorney.'43 For example, Maryland's attorney's lien
statute simply gives an attorney a security interest in a client's recovery."' It
does not grant the attorney an ownership interest in the fee.145 Indeed, most
attorney's lien statutes fail to provide the ownership interest and subsequent
control to the attorney that are necessary to shift tax liability for the contin-
gency fee to the attorney alone."4 Specifically, courts have found that the
attorney's lien laws of Alaska,147 Arizona,1 4 California, 49 the District of
Columbia, 50 Maryland,' 51 Pennsylvania, 5 2 North Carolina, 33 Nebraska, and
South Dakota 5 4 fail to grant attorneys an equitable interest in their clients'
attorneys any right and power over the suits, judgments, or decrees of their clients."), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that Alaska attorney's lien statute does not grant attorneys ownership interests like attorney's
liens in Alabama and Michigan), cerit denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001); Baylin v. United States, 43
F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that Maryland attorney's lien statute fails to grant
attorney ownership interests in fees).
143. See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (noting states in which attorney's lien
laws do not shift control over clients' claims and recoveries to attorneys).
144. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-501 (repl. 2000) (codifying attorney's
liens); Chanticleer Skyline Room, Inc. v. Oreer, 319 A.2d 802, 806 (Mid. 1974) (explaining that
Maryland's attorney's lien statute "merely places a charge upon the [recovery] as security for
the debt which is owed to the attorney by his client").
145. Chanticleer, 319 A.2d at 806.
146. See Davis, supra note 130, at 1716 (explaining that "the vast majority of charging lien
law fails to meet the first requirement for Coinam treatment under the Tax Court's strict
construction of the Cotnam decision*).
147. See Coady v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 257, 259 (1998) (finding that Alaska's
attorney's lien statute fails to give attorneys "the same fight and power over suits, judgments, and
decrees as their clients"), affrd, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
148. See Sinyard v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 654,658 (1998) (stating that no provision
exists under Arizona law to provide attorneys with legal interests in their clients' recoveries),
aft'd, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001).
149. See Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 787,790 (1998) (explaining that
California case law fails to "transfer to the attorney an ownership or proprietary interest in the
client's cause of action"), aff'd, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001).
150. See Smith v. Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1020 (1967) (noting that District of
Columbia lacks attorney's lien statute granting attorneys equitable interests in their clients'
causes of action).
151. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding Maryland
attorney's lien statute fails to grant attorney ownership interest in client's recovery).
152. See Estate of Oadlow v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 975, 980 (1968) (noting that, unlike
Alabama, Pennsylvania lacks statute granting attorney ownership in client's recovery).
153. See Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369,379 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that North Carolina
common law attorney's lien is distinguishable from Alabama attorney's lien statute).
154. See Petersen v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 137, 152 (1962) (explaining that neither South
Dakota nor Nebraska has attorney's lien statute granting "attorneys... the same right and power
over suits, judgments, and decrees as the clients had or may have").
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recoveries. The differences in state attorney's lien laws and in the application
of the assignment of income doctrine have led to a circuit split over the proper
taxation of contingency fees.
IV The Origins of the Circuit Split
A. Cotnam v. Commissioner
In Cotnam v. Commissioner,"'5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to address the federal income tax conse-
quences of a plaintiff's recovery under a contingency fee agreement with her
attorneys.5 6 Ethel Cotnam had promised to serve T. Shannon Hunter of
Mobile, Alabama, as a "friend" for the rest of his life in return for his promise
to give her one-fifth of his estate."' 7 Cotnam performed her part of the bargain
by serving Hunter for four and one-half years, but Hunter died intestate. s
After bringing suit against the administrator of Hunter's estate, Cotnam and her
attorneys obtained a judgment of $120,000. s9 Attorneys' fees amounted to
$50,365.83, based on a 40% contingency fee arrangement."6 The Commis-
155. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
156. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that sum plaintiff
paid to her attorneys under contingency fee agreement "should not be included in [plaintiff's]
gross income. This sum was income to the attorneys but not to Mrs. Cotnam."). In Cotnam, the
Fifth Circuit considered the tax consequences of Mrs. Cotnam's $120,000 judgment against the
estate of a man for whom she had served as an "attendant" for four and one-half years. Id. at 120-
21. The court first found that the verdict in Cotnam's favor represented the enforcement of a
contract for personal services, not the enforcement of a will. Id. at 122. Because this recovery
represented payment for personal services, the court found that it was taxable income to Cotnam.
Id. at 125. However, a majority of the court held that the IRS should not have included a portion
of the $120,000 recovery, (namely an amount of $50,365.83 paid to her attorneys) in her gross
income. Id. This amount was income to her attorneys only. Id. To justify this conclusion, the
court noted that Alabama law granted attorneys "the same right and power over" the suits of their
clients as their clients possessed.' Id. As a result, Cotnam never could have obtained the
$50,365.83 portion of the recovery (even if she had settled the case.herself) because of the
Alabama attorney's lien statute, which the court construed as forbidding Cotnam to realize as
income the contingency fee paid to her attorneys. Id. Furthermore, the court explained that the
contingency fee contract did not fall within Earl's assignment of income doctrine. Id. at 125.
Because Cotnam could not have recovered anything without the aid of her attorneys, the only
way she could have obtained any money was by agreeing to give her attorneys 40% of any
recovery. Id. at 126. The court reasoned that Cotnam had not fully enjoyed the economic benefit
of her claim because her attorneys were entitled to 40% of it. Id. at 125-26. As a result, the court
found that the portion of the recovery paid to the attorneys was not taxable income to Cotnam.
Id. at 126.
157. Id. at 120 & n.I.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 121; see also Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Cotnam, 34 So. 2d 122, 132 (Ala. 1948)
(affirming judgment for Cotnam).
160. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119,125 (Sth Cir. 1959).
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sioner of Internal Revenue viewed the entire $120,000 as income to Cotnam,
and assessed an income tax deficiency against her for $36,985.02.16 The Tax
Court found for the Commissioner, and Cotnamn appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 62
The Fifth Circuit first concluded that Cotnam's agreement to serve
Hunter did not allow her to claim the $120,000 as a non-taxable bequest;
instead, it was taxable ordinary income. 63 Judge John Minor Wisdom, in his
majority opinion, then tackled the issue of whether the portion of the recovery
Cotnam paid to her attorneys should be taxable to her."6 Judge Wisdom noted
that, under Alabama law, Cotnam could not have received the contingency fee
even if she had settled the case herself.6 Given the strong control rights that
Alabama's attorney's lien statute granted to attorneys, Judge Wisdom con-
cluded that Cotnam was unable to recognize income from the 40% of the
recovery she paid as a contingency fee.1"
In their concurrence, Judges Rives and Brown further reasoned that Cot-
nam's contingency fee arrangement with her attorneys was her only feasible
method of recovering against Hunter's estate. 67 Because Cotnam's claim had
no certain value, her only choice was to shift a future portion of it to her attor-
neys as part of a plan to obtain the rest ofthe value of her claim.'" According
161. Id. at 121.
162. Id.; see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 947,954 (1957) (concluding that amounts
Cotnam paid to her attorneys constituted gross income to Cotnam under Earrs assignment of
income doctrine), rev'd, 263 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1959).
163. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
164. See id. at 125 (concluding that sum was not gross income to Cotnam). Interestingly,
Judge Wisdom wrote both a majority and a dissenting opinion in this case. See id. at 120
(giving Judge Wisdom's majority opinion); id. at 126 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (giving Judge
Wisdom's dissent). The majority opinion focused on the Alabama attorney's lien statute as a
reason to conclude that the attorneys' fees paid by Cotnam should not be included in her taxable
income. Id. at 125. Arguing that the assignment of income doctrine did not apply in this case,
Judges Rives and Brown concurred with a brief addition. Id. at 125-26 (Rives & Brown, JJ.,
concurring). Judge Wisdom's dissent also focused on the assignment of income doctrine, but
he concluded that the doctrine did apply in Cotnam. Id. at 126-27 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); see
generally Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 434 n.35 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (listing
cases in which judge or justice writes both majority and dissenting opinions), aff'd, 259 F.3d
881 (7th Cir. 2001).
165. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
166. See id. (noting conclusion drawn by Judge Wisdom in his portion of majority opin-
ion); see also ALA. CODE § 64 (1940) (noting Alabama statute at issue in Cotnam). See Davis,
supra note 130, at 1700-08, for an additional discussion of the Cobnam decision.
167. Coinam, 263 F.3d at 125 (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring).
168. See id. (Rives and Brown, JJ., concurring) (stating that "[hier claim had no fair market
value, and it was doubtful and uncertain as to whether it had any value. The only economic
benefit she could then derive from her claim was to use a part of it in helping her to collect the
remainder.").
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to Judges Rives and Brown, this transfer of a right to a portion of her recovery
was not within the assignment of income doctrine as explained by the Su-
preme Court in Earl.69 Cotnam already had earned the income in question by
fulfilling her bargain with Hunter to serve him for the remainder of his life. 70
However, without the assistance of an attorney, all she had was a claim for
payment; her attorneys helped her realize the value of her claim and collect
it.' 7' Thus, the judges concluded that the doctrine of assignment of income
did not apply in a case such as this one in which only 60% of the judgment
ever passed through Cotnam's hands." The other 40% of the recovery was
income to Cotnam's attorney, whose assistance had enabled Cotnam to recov-
er her portion.' The concurring judges also dismissed the Commissioner's
argument that Cotnam legally had obligated herself to pay her attorneys the
fee. 74 Cotnam had to pay the fee only if the suit was successful; defeat would
have removed any obligation to pay her attorneys.'75
In his dissent, 76 Judge Wisdom asserted that Cotnam's case was clearly
within the bounds of the assignment of income doctrine.177 The crux of
Wisdom's argument was that Cotnam had exercised enough control over the
disposition of the funds to her attorneys to conclude that she had received a
direct benefit from those funds.7 " Furthermore, Cotnam had already earned
169. Id. (Rives and Brown, JJ., concuring); see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15
(1930) (explaining assignment of income doctrine); supra notes 79-127 and accompanying text
(explaining development of assignment of income doctrine).
170. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119,125 (5th Cir. 1959) (Reves &Brown, JJ., concur-
ring).
171. See id. at 126 (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) (noting that "[t]he services of her
attorneys resulted in converting that claim into a judgment and the collection of the judgment").
172. See id. (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) ("That doctrine can have no just or realistic
application to a case like this, where the only economic benefit to the taxpayer was as an aid to
the collection of a part of an otherwise worthless claim.").
173. Id. (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring).
174. See id. (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) (noting that Commissioner's argument was
based on "false premise").
175. See id. (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) (noting that Cotnam fully paid her attorneys
by transferring part of "doubtful claim" to them). Noting the fruit of the tree metaphor used
in Earl, Judges Rives and Brown explained that Cotnam's tree "had bome no fruit and would
have been barren if she had not transferred a part interest in that tree to her attorneys, who
then rendered the services necessary to bring forth the fruit." Id. (Rives & Brown, JJ., con-
curring).
176. See supra note 164 (explaining that Judge Wisdom wrote both majority and dissenting
opinions).
177. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1959) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[tIhis case is stronger than Horst ... since Mrs. Cotnam assigned the right to
income already earned").
178. Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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the income she assigned to her attorneys.'79 Thus, finding the facts in Cotnam
indistinguishable from those in Horst, Judge Wisdom felt compelled to apply
the assignment of income doctrine.'
B. Cotnam's Successors
1. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States
Two recent court of appeals cases have followed the holding in Cotnam.1 81
In Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States,'8 Arthur Clarks
recovered $11,307,875.55 from K-Mart for personal injuries." 3 Of that
179. Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 126 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (stating that "this case is governed by the
principles set forth in Helvering v. Harst"); see also supra notes 90-102 (discussing Horst).
181. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (refusing to distin-
guish Cotnam and reversing Tax Court's decision that contingency fees are included in client's
gross income); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th
Cir. 2000) (stating "[w]e follow Cotnam" and refusing to include contingency fees in client's
gross income).
182. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
183. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 855, 858
(6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that attorney's contingency fee was not gross income to client who
had received personal injury award). In Estate of Clarks, the court considered whether
$1,901,314.67 of interest Clarks paid to his attorney as part of a contingency fee agreement was
includible as gross income for Clarks. Id. at 855. Clarks had recovered a large judgment from
K-Mart for personal injuries as well as $5,707,837.55 in interest on that judgment. Id. The
principal amount of the award and Clarks's attorney's part of it were not at issue in the case
because Internal Revenue Code § 104(aX2) does not include any award for personal physical
injuries in gross income. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (mandating
exclusion from gross income for damages paid for physical personal injuries). From the interest
award, Clarks paid $1,901,314.67 (33.3%) directly to his attorney pursuant to a contingency fee
agreement. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855. Interest awards are includable in gross income,
and the IRS claimed that the entire interest award, including the attorney's portion, was gross
income to Clarks. Id. This finding subjected Clarks's estate to additional taxes and the AMT.
Id. Challenging the government's determination of his tax liabilities and seeking a refund,
Clarks's estate filed suit in federal court. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for
the government. Id. at 856. The Sixth Circuit, after noting the existence of a circuit split, found
that Michigan's common law of attorney's liens operated "in more or less the same way as the
(statutory] Alabama lien in Coinam." Id. Therefore, Michigan law caused Clarks's estate to
receive no gross income from the attorney's portion of the recovery. See id. (adopting this result
from Cotnam). Turning to the assignment of income doctrine, the court concluded that the
Cotnam court had properly distinguished the Supreme Court's decisions in Earl and Horst. Id.
at 857. Explaining the differences between the instant case and Earl and Horst, the Sixth Circuit
said that Clarks's estate did not seek to use the contingency fee to shift tax liabilities among
family members and that the value of Clarks's claim against K-Mart was "entirely speculative
and dependent on the services of counsel." Id. Thus, the Michigan common law attorney's lien
and the speculative nature of Clarks's claim operated in tandem to transfer to Clarks's attorney
an ownership interest in the contingency fee, an interest that makes the attorney alone liable for
federal income taxes on the sum. Id.
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amount, K-Martpaid $5,707,837.55 as interest. 84 K-Martpaid $1,901,314.67
directly to Clarks's attorneypursuant to a contingency fee agreement that
Clarks had previously signed with the attorney." s' Clarks's estate sought to
exclude from his gross income the amount paid to his attorney.
186
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Clarks and based its reasoning squarely on
the Cotnam decision. 17 The court found that Michigan's common law attor-
ney's lien operated similarly to the Alabama statute in Cotnam. "" That is, the
Michigan attorney's lien gave Clarks's attorney an ownership interest in the
contingency fee portion of the recovery. 9
The court also concluded that the majority in Cotnam had properly
distinguished Earl and Horst." In particular, the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the Cotnam court's reasoning that both Earl and Horst involved intrafamily
donative transfers that were motivated solely to avoid income tax liability.'9 '
Clarks's hiring an attorney and agreeing to a contingency fee contract clearly
did not involve an intrafamily transfer and was not part of a tax avoidance
scheme."
Additionally, the court focused on the speculative nature of Clarks's
claim and the necessity of relying on the work of counsel in order for the
claim to come to fruition. 93 The court explained that Clarks's only practical
use of his claim was to transfer part of its value to an attorney in the hopes of
collecting the remaining value through legal action.' Reasoning that
184. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 855.
187. See id. at 856-57 (giving court's decision and noting its reliance on Cotnam for
guidance); see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (relying onAlabama
attorney's lien statute to exclude contingency fee from client's gross income); id. at 125-26
(Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) (distinguishing Cotnam from Earl and Horst and arguing that
assignment of income doctrine does not apply to contingency fees).
188. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 857; see also supra notes 79-89 and 114-23 and accompanying text (discussing
Earl); supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text (discussing Horst).
191. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir.
2000); see also Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring) (distinguishing facts
of Cotnam from Earl and HorsO.
192. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857 (stating that Clarks's purpose in entering into
contingency fee agreement was not to shift tax liabilities among his family members, but was
made with "a hope to receive money from the lawyer's efforts and the client's right").
193. See id. (explaining speculative nature of Clarks's claim and his reliance on his
attorney to obtain any recovery).
194. See id. (stating that "[t]he only economic benefit Clarks could derive from his claim
against the defendant... was to use the contingent part of it to help him collect the remainder").
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Clarks's conveyance of a percentage interest in his recovery to his attorney
was more like a division of property than an assignment of income, the court
excluded the contingency fee from Clarks's gross income. 95
2. Srivastava v. Commissioner
In Srivastava v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit rejected an attack on
Cotnam and found that contingency fees are not included in a client's gross
income."9 Dr. Srivastava and his wife recovered damages for defamation in
a settlement with the insurers of a Texas television station.'" Srivastava
sought to exclude from his gross income the contingency fees he paid to his
195. See id. at 858 (likening contingency fee to division of property by saying that "the
client as assignor has transferred some of the trees in his orchard, not merely the fruit from the
trees. The lawyer has become a tenant in common of the orchard owner and must cultivate and
care for and harvest the fruit of the entire tract."). But see infra notes 208-12 and accompanying
text (discussing problems with division of property analogy).
196. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
197. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
attorneys' contingent fees are excluded from client's gross income). In Srivastava, the court
considered whether a contingency fee was gross income to a client. Id. at 355. Srivastava
received S8.5 million to settle his defamation claims against a television station. Id. The parties
did not separate the settlement into portions for actual damages (non-taxable) versus punitive
damages and interest (taxable). Id. at 356. Arguing that the entire settlement represented
payment for actual damages, Srivastava reported no income from the settlement. Id. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's division of the settlement between taxable and non-taxable
damages and then turned to the tax issues surrounding the contingency fee. Id. at 356-57, 367.
First the court observed that if it was deciding this case "on a tabula rasa, [it] might be inclined
to include contingent fees in gross income." Id. at 357. The court discussed the assignment of
income doctrine and concluded that the doctrine should not allow Srivastava to escape taxation
on the portion of his recovery paid to his lawyer. Id. at 360-63. The court reasoned that, absent
a contingency fee agreement, Srivastava would have had to pay his attorney out of his own
pocket, so the "simple fortuity" of signing a contingency fee agreement ought not give him
"preferential tax treatment" over individuals who actually do pay their lawyers with their own
funds. Id. at 363. However, the court noted the Cotnam decision, finding it "substantially
indistinguishable" from the instant case, and decided to reverse the Tax Court and frnd that
contingent fees governed by Texas law are excludable. Id. at 357-58. The court found its own
reasoning using the assignment of income doctrine to le contrary to the Cotnam decision and
refused the Commissioner's request to overturn that case. Id. at 363, 365. Finally, the court
rejected an attempt by the Commissioner to distinguish Cotnam by the fact that the Texas
attorney's lien statute granted fewer ownership rights over clients' recoveries than the Alabama
statute. Id. at 363-64. The Fifth Circuit did not consider an attorney's power to pursue relief
against a party opposing his client to be relevant to an assignment of income analysis, which
f6cuses on a taxpayer's degree of control over an asset Id. For a further discussion on the
reasoning of the Srivastava decision, see generally Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Note, Taxation of
an Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive Damages Recovery: The Srivastava Approach,
15 BYU J. PUB. L. 301 (2001).
198. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 355.
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attorneys.' 99 The court noted that if the case had been one of first impression,
it probably would have forced Srivastava to include the fees in his gross
income.2 ' However, the court found the facts in Srivastava practically
identical to those in Cotnam and, given Cotnam's value as precedent in the
Fifth Circuit, ruled for the plaintiffs. 20 1 The court refused to overrule Cotnam
despite its reservations about the Cotnam court's reasoning precisely because
of stare decisis.m
In deciding whether to apply the assignment of income doctrine, the
Srivastava court considered two analogies to characterize the contingent fee
attorney-client relationship.203 First, relying on Estate of Clarks, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that the client's claim and recovery is subject to co-owner-
ship by the attorney and client in a partnership.2' Under a partnership anal-
ogy, the attorney and client would share the profits of any recovery.' 5 The
court rejected this analogy, stating that the fiduciary duty of an attorney to his
client cannot be converted easily into a partnership. 2" Further, professional
rules of conduct also prohibit an attorney from forming a partnership with a
non-lawyer if the partnership will involve the practice of law.2'
Second, the court considered analogizing the contingent fee attorney-
client relationship to a division of property.2'a Under this analogy, the client
199. Id. at 357.
200. See id. (noting that court was not deciding this case "on a tabula rasa"). The Fifth
Circuit stated in dictum that, absent the Cobnam precedent, it might have found the assignment
of income doctrine applicable to Snvastava, forcing him to include the contingency fees in his
gross income. Id. at 363.
201. See id. at 357-58 (stating that Cotnam is "substantially indistinguishable" from
Srivastava); see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1959) (giving facts
in Cotnam).
202. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363, 365. One could infer from Srivastava that attorneys and
clients engaged in similar future litigation may need another theory to supplement Cotnam's
rationale because the Fifth Circuit all but repudiated the reasoning of Coinam in Srivastava.
See id. at 357-63 (considering assignment'of income doctrine at length in dictum).
203. See id. at 360 (noting use of partnership or joint venture analogy and division of
property analogy).
204. See id. (quoting Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854,
857 (2000)); see also Kalinka, supra note 11, at 20-21 (explaining possible formation of
partnership between attorney and client).
205. Kalinkasupra note ll,at2l.
206. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353,360 n.21 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kenseth
v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,413 (2000)).
207. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2000) ("A lawyer shall not form
a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice
of law."); Kalinka, supra note 11, at 21-22 (stating ethical restrictions on attorney-client
partnerships for contingency fee cases).
208. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
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transfers a portion of his income-producing claim to the attorney.209 Yet, as
the Srivastava court notes, "contingent fee provisions assign more than just
the fruit - and yet divest clients of something less than the entire tree. ' 210 The
court rejected this analogy because of the ambiguity as to what exactly the
client transfers to the attorney.21' Despite the court's rejection of both analo-
gies, the division of property analogy laid a foundation upon which a share-
cropping metaphor can be built.2
Snvastava stands as a warning to future taxpayers who seek to exclude
contingency fees from their gross inome.213 Excluding contingency fees from
a client's gross income raises questions of horizontal equity.2 4 Despite its
209. Id.; see also Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th Cir.
2000) (explaining that contingency fees are like "a division of property").
210. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360.
211. Id. The Srivastava court's use of the division of property analogy implied that the
property transferred to the attorney is guaranteed to produce income. See id. ("[C]ontingent fee
arrangements, to be sure, assign a percentage of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement
agreement... to the attorney."). As Estate of Clarks suggests, the property transferred is like
"some of the trees in [client's] orchard." 202 F.3d at 857-58. For the division of property
analogy to work, those trees must be full of ripe fruit in order to guarantee payment to the
attorney. However, at the time a contingency fee contract is signed, there is no guarantee of
payment for the attorney. The client's fruit trees are bare and will require the work of a careful
and dedicated grower to insure that they do bear fruit. Likewise, a client's claim at the signing
of a contingency fee contract actually is an unproven claim of potential, not certain, value.
Therein lies the failure of the division of property analogy. The analogy does not explain the true
contingent nature of the claim and the control that the attorney must necessarily have over it.
The sharecropping analogy does. In a sharecropping agreement, like a contingency fee agree-
ment, neither the tenant (attorney) nor the landlord (client) are certain of the amount of income
that the cropland will produce. However, with the tenant controlling the raising of the crops,
income can be generated for both tenant and landlord. This more accurately characterizes a
contingency fee agreement. See infra notes 256-337 and accompanying text (explaining share-
cropping analogy).
212. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that "contingent
fee provisions assign more than just the fruit and yet divest clients of something less than the
entire tree"). The next step to reach the sharecropping analogy is to add the full analysis of the
attorney's work on the case. The attorney brings the claim to fruition through his skill and
effort. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,450 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that
attorneys, through their work, add "substantial value" to clients' claims), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001).
213. See supra note 202 (noting almost complete repudiation of Cotnam by Srivastava
court).
214. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363 ("[Wf there were no contingent fee arrangement,
Srivastava presumably would have had to compensate counsel out of his own pocket .... He
ought not receive preferential tax treatment from the simple fortuity that he hired counsel on a
contingent basis."). For a further argument that the Srivastava decision impugns the doctrine
of separation of powers, see Darren J. Campbell, Comment, Wiping the Slate Clean: An Exam-
ination on How a Court's Characterization of Contingent Attorney's Fees Implicates the
Alternative Minimum Tax and Affects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 171,200 (2001).
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reservations, the court relied on Cotnam to find for the client.215 Future tax-
payers will need stronger arguments to overcome state attorney's lien statutes
and the assignment of income doctrine if they want to exclude contingency
fees from their gross income.216
C. Baylin v. United States
In Baylin v. United States, 217 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, while not even acknowledging the Cotnam decision, reached
the opposite conclusion of Cotnam regarding the tax liabilities for contin-
gency fees.218  Baylin and his partnership, Painters Mill Venture, contested
Campbell argues that Congress alone has the power to define the concept of gross income; a
court that excludes contingency fees from gross income "violate[s] the separation of power
doctrine by diminishing congressional taxing power." Id.
215. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365 (refusing to challenge Conam decision).
216. See id. at 363 (noting that court, if Cotnam did not exist as precedent, "might apply
the anticipatory assignment [of income] doctrine to hold that contingent fees are gross income
to client"); id. at 364 (arguing that tax liability for contingency fees "does not depend on the
intricacies of an attorney's bundle of rights" under state law).
217. 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
218. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming order that
"portion of the condemnation award paid to [Baylin's] attorney under a contingency fee
agreement was gross income to the [plaintiff]"). In Baylin, the Federal Circuit considered the
tax implications arising for Baylin, the tax-matters partner of a partnership that owned 137 acres
of land condemned by the Maryland State Highway Administration, following a dispute over
the fair value of the land. Id. at 1452. The government of Maryland paid the partnership
$2,699,775 for the land pursuant to the state's condemnation law. Id. The partnership filed
suit, contesting the condemnation award, and a jury awarded them $3,899,000, as well as inter-
est and costs. Id. The partnership appealed this award to the state appeals court, but the parties
reached a settlement in the amount of $16,319,522.91. Id. at 1453. The amount was divided
between S10,625,850 in principal for the land and $6,358,418 in interest. Id. While the part-
nership originally reported a capital gain on the sale of the land of $7, 297,828, the IRS classi-
fied all of the legal fees as capital expenditures, leaving the partnership with a reformulated
capital gain of $5,274,964. Id. The IRS classified the interest as taxable interest income in the
amount of $6, 205, 273. Id. The parties agreed that the legal fees expended in an effort to
increase the amount paid for the land by the Highway Administration were capital expenditures.
Id. However, the partnership argued that, because it was working with its attorneys on a
contingency fee basis, it "should be allowed to deduct from interest income an amount of its
attorney's fees proportionally equivalent to the amount of the settlement classified as interest."
Id. The partnership sought to deduct approximately one-half of their legal fees, about
$2,000,000, because one-half of the partnership's recovery after the appeal represented interest
on the condemnation award. Id. The court, however, rejected the partnership's argument that
the fees were deductible because those particular fees were used to generate the interest portion
of the award. Id. at 1454. The court noted that the record reflected that the attorney spent only
a small amount of his time trying to increase the amount of the interest award. Id. The
partnership then argued that the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney was never part of
the partnership's gross income. Id. The court, citing Lucas v. Earl, stated that such an argu-
ment would allow a "skillfully devised" arrangement to avoid federal income taxes. Id. The
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the Maryland State Highway Administration's condemnation of 137 acres
of land owned by the partnership.2" 9 The partnership eventually recovered
$16,319,522.19 as the fair market value of the land.22 The partnership's legal
fees amounted to $4,048,424.221 In the tax dispute that followed, Baylin and
the IRS agreed that the portion of the fees attributed to the attorney's efforts
to increase the principal amount of the condemnation award was a nondeduct-
ible capital expense pursuant to § 263(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.222
However, the parties disagreed over the tax consequences of the portion of the
attorney's fees attributable to interest.
223
The partnership argued that it should not have to include the portion of
the recovery paid to its attorney in its gross income because the Maryland
State Highway Administration paid the attorneys directly. 4 The partnership
never possessed the money with which it paid its attorney. 225 The court
quickly dismissed this argument as being the very sort of carefully crafted
contingency fee agreement that valued form over substance in permitting the
partnership to avoid taxation.226 The court emphasized in its reasoning the
value that the partnership received from the attorney's services constituted
income, even if the money never actually came into the possession of the
partnership.' This benefit and value that the partnership received from the
agreement was evidence to the court that the arrangement fell under the
assignment of income doctrine illustrated in Horst.
21
court found that the partnership exercised enough power and control over the recovery as to
allow the income to be assigned to the partnership within the guidance of Helvering v. Horst.
Id. at 1454-55. Alternatively, the court rejected the partnership's attempt to rely on the Mary-
land attorney's lien statute as creating an ownership interest in the potential fee for the attorney.
Id. at 1455. The court noted that Maryland courts have not construed the statute to grant such
an interest to attorneys. Id. The court concluded that the entire condemnation award was gross
income to the partnership. Id.
219. See id. at 1452-53 (noting Baylin filed suit in state court and appealed jury's award
to state appellate court).
220. Id. at 1453.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see I.R.C. § 263(a) (1994) (denying deductions for expenses "made to increase
the value of any property or estate").
223. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1453-54 (noting that Baylin argued that he should deduct from
his gross income attorney's fees attributed to trying to increase interest award).
224. See id. at 1454 (noting partnership's argument).
225. Id. at 1454.
226. Id.
227. See id. (noting that "partnership received the benefit" of contingency fee funds and
that fee arrangement signified "the value that the parties placed on the attorney's services").
228. See id. (stating that partnership "assigned a portion of its condemnation recovery to
its attorney"); see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1940) (explaining assignment
of income doctrine).
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The speculative nature of Baylin's claim did not sway the court.'
According to the court, the uncertain nature of the contingency fee had no
place in an analysis of the tax liabilities for the fee.230 In the eyes of the
Federal Circuit, the contingency fee arrangement did not mean that the portion
of the fee paid to the attorney never constituted income to the partnership.23'
The contingency fee agreement merely served as a method for both parties to
estimate the value of the legal services that the attorney provided. 232 The fact
that the state, instead of the partnership, paid the fee directly to the attorney
simply demonstrated that the agreement allowed the state to discharge the
partnership from having to make the actual payment of the fee.
233
Baylin and his partnership also argued that the Maryland attorney's lien
statute gave the attorney an ownership interest in the fee." 4 As the owner of
that portion of the fee, the fee would be gross income to the attorney and not
to the partnership. " ' The court found this argument groundless." 6 It noted
that Maryland courts had not interpreted the statute as granting such a strong
and controlling interest in a possible fee to an attorney. 7 The court, while
not expressly rejecting the idea that an attorney's lien statute could determine
the tax consequences of a contingency fee, found the Maryland statute
unsupportive of the partnership's claims.38
229. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that partner-
ship did not know final amount it would owe its attorney when legal action commenced). But
see Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that assignment of income doctrine does not apply to Clarks's "speculative claim");
Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rives and Brown, JJ., concurring)
(concluding that assignment of income doctrine does not apply to Cotnam's "doubtful and
uncertain" claim).
230. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (noting that "[t]he temporary uncertain magnitude of the
legal fees under such an arrangement and the vehicle of an assignment cannot dictate the income
tax treatment of those fees").




234. Id.; see also MD. CODE. ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-501 (1989) (codifying
attorney's liens).
235. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting implication
of partnership's argument).
236. Id.
237. Id.; see also Chanticleer Skyline Room, Inc. v. Greer, 319 A.2d 802, 806 (Md. 1974)
(noting that "[1l]ike any other lien, this lien does not create an ownership interest in the attorney,
but merely places a charge upon the fund as security for the debt which is owed to the attorney
by the client").
238. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (reaching conclusion solely utilizing Maryland's statute
and taking no position on use of state attorney's lien statutes for determining tax consequences
for contingency fees).
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D. Coady v. Commissioner
In Coady v. Commissioner, 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit followed Baylin and Judge Wisdom's dissent in Cotnam.24
Coady recovered a large judgment for back pay and benefits from the Alaska
Housing Finance Corporation for wrongful termination."' Coady and her hus-
band sought to exclude the legal fees from their gross income, arguing that the,
legal fees were gross income to their attorney alone.242 The court rejected this
argument and the Coadys' reliance on Cotnam."3
The court first distinguished the Alaska attorney's lien statute from the
Alabama statute at issue in Cotnam.2" Alaska's attorney's lien statute neither
239. 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
240. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1187, 1190(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
plaintiff's gross income includes amounts paid to attorneys under contingency fee agreement),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001). In Coady, the court confronted the question of whether the
Coadys could exclude from their gross income the portion of Nina Coady's recovery they paid
their attorney pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Id. at 1187. Nina Coady recovered a
judgment from the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC) for wrongful termination in
the amount of $373,307. Id. The AHFC, after withholding appropriate federal taxes, issued her
a check for $259,610.89. Id. Of that amount, $221,338.32 went to the Coadys' attorneys for
litigation costs and a one-third portion of the recovery as called for in the contingency fee
agreement. Id. at 1187-88. In the suit in the United States Tax Court, the parties agreed that
$53,121 of those legal fees were properly deductible as a miscellaneous deduction. Id. at 1188.
However, they disagreed over the tax treatment of the remaining $168,217, with the Coadys
arguing that the amount should be excluded from gross income. Id. The Coadys relied on
Cotnam and argued that the amount should not be included in their gross income because "they
'assigned' that portion of their settlement to counsel." Id. However, the court, noting that
Cotnam had been rejected by the Federal Circuit in Baylin and the First Circuit in Alexander,
concluded that the facts of the instant case were distinguishable from Cotnam. Id. at 1190. The
Alaska attorney's lien statute does not create the ownership interest that such a lien does in
Alabama or Michigan. Id. The court found that the Coadys' award was in lieu of.wages and
compensation, which are both clearly included in gross income, so that its subsequent exclusion
would defeat the purpose of the income tax laws. Id. The Coadys simply used a portion of that
income to pay their attorneys. Id. at 1191. The court then cited Horst and Earl for the proposi-
tion that income taxes cannot be avoided by arrangements to shift income to other parties. Id.
The assignment of income doctrine forced the Coadys to include the contingency fee in their
gross income. Id. The Ninth Circuit followed Coady in Jts brief opinion in Benci-Woodward
v. Comm 'r, 219 F.3d 941,942-43 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001), conclud-
ing that the California attorney lien statute operates similarly to the Alaska statute.
241. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1187.
242. Id. at 1188. The Coadys specifically sought to exclude the legal fees included in their
gross income despite the application of § 67 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Coadys took
a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the legal fees, but § 67 only allows the deduction to the
extent the fees exceed 2% of their adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 67 (1994) (noting
provisions on miscellaneous deductions).
243. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
244. Id. Compare Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank, 783 P.2d 1164, 1168
(Alaska 1989) (explaining that no ownership interest in client's recovery passes to attorney
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grants any ownership rights over the recovery nor transfers control over clients'
lawsuits, judgments, or decrees to an attorney.2 41 Second, the court found that
the assignment of income doctrine governed the transaction between Coady and
her attorney.246 Coady asserted that the uncertainty of recovering any damages
at the time she entered into the contingency fee agreement with her attorney
distinguished her case from the assignment of income precedents.2 47 However,
the Ninth Circuit previously held that an assignment of a potentially contingent
amount of income was not grounds for denying the application of the assign-
ment of income doctrine.2" The court concluded that the Coadys could not
avoid federal income tax liability for the legal fees by diverting them to her
attorney through a pre-arranged contingency fee agreement.
249
According to both Baylin and Coady, the client retained ultimate control
over the recovery at issue.250 Under such an analysis, the assignment of
income doctrine made the contingency fee part of the client's gross income. 1
The applicable attorney's lien statutes kept the attorneys from gaining any
ownership and control interests over the recovery.2 2 The question emerging
under Alaska's attorney's lien statute), appeal after remand, 810 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1991), and
ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.430 (Michie 2000) ("This lien is... subordinate to the rights existing
between the parties to the action or proceeding."), with Cotuarn v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125
(5th Cir. 1959) (discussing Alabama attorney's lien statute), and ALA. CODE §§ 34-3-61(b)
(1975) ("[Afttorneys at law shall have the same right and power over action and judgment...
as their clients.").
245. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
246. Id. at 1191.
247. Id.
248. See Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957,959 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "uncertain,
doubtful, and contingent" fee remains income to assignor under assignment of income doctrine).
The Federal Circuit also rejected the argument that the uncertainty of a contingency fee prevents
the application of the assignment of income doctrine. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d
1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The temporarily uncertain magnitude of the legal fees under [a
contingency fee agreement] and the vehicle of an assignment cannot dictate the income tax
treatment of those fees.").
249. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972
(2001).
250. See id. at 1190 (explaining that control over recovery vested solely in Coady as her
attorney obtained no ownership rights over recovery); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (stating that
attorney had no control interests over Baylin's recovery); see also Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r,
219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that attorney acquires "no more than a professional
interest" in client's claim and recovery), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001).
251. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (using assignment of income doctrine to include contin-
gency fee in Coady's gross income); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454-55 (explaining that assignment of
income doctrine makes contingency fee gross income to Baylin).
252. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190 (stating that Alaska's attorney's lien statute does not
give attorneys ownership interests in clients' recoveries); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (noting that
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from these cases and other cases involving the taxation of contingency fees is
whether the results accurately characterize the attorney-client relationship 2 3
In Baylin and Coady, the client was in complete control.' A more accurate
description of the attorney-client relationship is one where neither party has
complete control, but the attorney's share of control grows over time.255 A
new analogy is needed to properly demonstrate that shift in control and to
better apportion the tax burden for the recovery.
V The Sharecropping Analogy
In his dissent in Kenseth, Judge Beghe suggests that an analogy to share-
cropping is the most accurate way to characterize the relationship between a
client and his contingent fee attorney. 2 6 In the sharecropping analogy, the
client is the landlord, and, instead of cropland, the client/landlord has a legal
claim. 2s7 The attorney is the tenant-farmer, and he works on the client's claim
to produce a fritful recovery that both can share.' This analogy is accurate
because it properly characterizes the relative amount of control that each party
in the relationship has. 9 It also appropriately handles the assignment of in-
come doctrine and state law governing attorney's liens.2' ° Each of these
points will be discussed in turn.
A. Attorneys' Control over Kenseth 's Claim
On the issue of relative control, Kenseth's attorneys effectively removed
him from control of his own lawsuit and from any control over the eventual
Maryland attorney's lien statute prevents attorneys from obtaining ownership interest over
clients' recoveries).
253. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 422 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (arguing
that lawyers handling contingency fee cases have strong degree of control over clients' claims),
a.rfd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
254. Supra note 250.
255. See inffra notes 261-279 and accompanying text (explaining how attorney's control
over client's claim grows as claim progrsses through legal channels).
256. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting).
259. See infra notes 261-305 and accompanying text (discussing attorney's control over
client's underlying legal claim).
260. See irfra notes 317-31 and accompanying text (discussing how sharecropping analogy
handles assignment of income doctriney, infra notes 332-37 and accompanying text (discussing
how sharecropping analogy deals with doctrine of state attorney's lien statutes).
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 597 (2002)
contingency fee.26 Control over the lawsuit and recovery was the most
important fact of the case.26 Before Kenseth contacted. any attorney to deal
with his claim, he had complete dominion over it.263 From the moment he
obtained legal representation to seek redress on his claim, he began to cede
control over the claim to his attorneys.2" Kenseth likely could not have
afforded to hire a lawyer on an hourly basis.265 Instead, he obtained represen-
tation by signing a contingency fee agreement.2" Indeed, his attorneys would
not have represented him unless he signed the contingency fee agreement.267
The agreement had several provisions that drastically reduced Kenseth's
control over his claim.' Most restrictive was Clause VI of the agreement,
which denied the client the right to settle his case without contacting his
attorneys.269 The agreement contained another provision giving Fox & Fox
a lien for its fees against any money recovered through the suit.2 ° This lien
made payment of legal fees a priority over distributions of the recovery to the
plaintiffs.271 Furthermore, had Kenseth chosen to terminate the agreement
261. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,443 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting), aff'd, 259 F.3d
881 (7th Cir. 2001); see also id. at 441-47 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (discussing application of
assignment of income doctrine to control issues in contingency fee case).
262. See id. at 422 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that "elements of control over the
prosecution of the ADEA claims ceded by Mr. Kenseth and assumed and exercised by Fox &
Fox under the contingent fee agreement make it reasonable to include in petitioner's income
only Mr. Kenseth's net share of the settlement proceeds").
263. See id. at 422-23 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining that Kenseth's attorneys' interest
in his case only took shape after he retained their services). Prior to Kenseth retaining his
attorneys, they could not have taken any action in an attempt to obtain redress for Kenseth's
claim. Kenseth alone could have sought damages from his employer, but his efforts likely
would have been futile.
264. Id. at 401 (discussing contingency fee agreement between Kenseth and Fox & Fox
and restrictions on Kenseth's ability to settle without Fox & Fox's consent).
265. See id. at 400-02 (discussing contingency fee agreement agreed to by Kenseth and fact
that $500 win-or-lose retainer was all Kenseth had to advance to his attorneys out of his own
pocket).
266. Id. at 400.
267. See Kenneth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 400 (2000) (characterizing contingency fee
contract as one "routinely used"), af'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); id. at 422 (Beghe, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that Fox & Fox would not represent Kenseth without Kenseth first
signing contingency fee agreement). The relevant portions of the contingent fee agreement as
cited by the Tax Court are located at 114 T.C. 401-02.
268. See id. at 401 (discussing contingency fee agreement and provisions).
269. See id. at 401 (noting that contingency fee agreement restricts client's right to
"compromise or settle the case without the written consent of the attorneys").
270. Id. at 402.
271. See id. (noting Clause VIII of contingency fee agreement between Kenseth and his
attorneys).
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with Fox & Fox, he would have owed the firm for all of his outstanding
c 272
Kenseth's suit was part of a class action, and each member of the class
signed an identical agreement with Fox & Fox.2" Fox & Fox thus had control
over the direction, legal strategy, and handling of all seventeen individuals'
claims. 274 As the case progressed, with the attorneys filing more documents
and conducting discovery, Kenseth and the other sixteen plaintiffs began to
lose their right to control the ultimate destiny of their suit.27 Kenseth lost the
flexibility to hire and fire his attorney at will that a single plaintiff enjoys.276
Given his obligation to pay all accrued legal fees if he terminated the repre-
sentation of Fox & Fox, the size of the suit, and the number of plaihtiffs,
Kenseth's potential liability was quite substantial.2" Regardless of the
amount, however, the effect was clear.278 Once Fox & Fox was heavily
engaged in representing Kenseth, he effectively lost the ability and lacked the
resources to change or discharge the attorneys handling his constitutional
claim.
279
The level of control that Kenseth ceded to his attorneys regarding the
handling of his case is neither surprising nor especially troubling.280 The
record in Kenseth reflected no evidence that Kenseth was upset with the
272. See id. (stating that "all outstanding costs and disbursements" would be due to Fox
& Fox "within ten... days of the termination of the contract").
273. Id. at 400.
274. See id. at 400-02 (commenting that all class members signed identical contingency
fee agreements, which included restrictions on plaintiffs' right to settle their case without
knowledge or approval of Fox & Fox).
275. See id. at 424 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (stating that plaintiffs relied on "guidance and
expertise" of their attorneys in their dealings with APV).
276. See id. at 423 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (explaining that presence of sixteen other
plaintiffs was "additional practical impediment" to Kenseth's individual ability to hire and fire
his attorney).
277. See id. at 423 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (stating that "impediment" to Kenseth's ability
to change his representation grew as Fox & Fox became more involved in case and as claim
progressed through administrative and court channels); id. at 402 (noting Kenseth's obligation
to pay attorney's fees in event he fires his attorneys).
278. See id. at 444 (Beghe, J., dissenting) ("All these factors contributed, as a practical
matter, to the creation of substantial barriers to Mr. Kenseth's ability to fire Fox & Fox and to
hire other attorneys or to try to settle his case himself.").
279. See id. (noting that Kenseth lost control of his age discrimination claim).
280. See id. at 400 (stating that contingency fee agreement entered into by Kenseth "was
a form contract prepared and routinely used by" his attorneys). This level of control granted to
attorneys is quite common in attorney-client relationships involving cbntingency fees. See
MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 63 (explaining that contingency fees routinely give attorneys
contract rights to perform any legal tasks necessary to obtain redress for client).
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representation of Fox & Fox,s and the result in the case was a clear victory
for both Kenseth and his attorneys.2"2 They recovered a total of $2.65 million,
of which Kenseth's share was $229,501.37.2"3 His share of the attorneys' fees
was $91,800.54.84 Of course, the question was how to classify the recovery
and contingency fee for determining Kenseth's tax liability.2"5 The sharecrop-
ping analogy provides an ideal solution.2"6
B. Tenant's Control over Landlord's Croplands
Prior to the planting season, a landlord has complete control over his
croplands. The fields are his, and he may do with them whatever he pleases.
However, once the landlord commits to a sharecropping agreement, he largely
relinquishes dominion over the crops and land to the tenant-farner. s7 The
tenant-farner prepares the soil and plants the crop, using his judgment to
proceed in a manner that will maximize the crop yield.2"' Once the tenant-
fanner is substantially involved in the planting, the landlord has effectively
lost control over the crops growing in his fields.2"9 Of course, he could seize
control of the crops from the tenant-farmer, but he would be liable for dam-
ages.2' The situationwas the same for Eldon Kenseth. 9
281. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,425 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that
neither Kenseth nor any other class member had "expressed dissatisfaction with the services of
Fox & Fox or tried to bring in other attorneys to participate in or take over the prosecution of
any of the ... claims"), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
282. See id. at 404 (noting that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recommended
that Kenseth's and other class members' ADEA claims be settled "for less than $1 million in
the aggregate").
283. Id.
284. Id. at 405.
285. See id. at 400 (noting main issue in case).
286. See id. at 454-55 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (suggesting that solution to tax consequences
of contingency fees can be found by using analogy to sharecropping).
287. See Stewart v. Young, 103 So. 44, 45-46 (Ala. 1925) (noting that tenant-farmer in
sharecropping arrangement has right to possession of crops "while growing and being gathered"
to exclusion of landlord).
288. See Sledge v. Potts, 32 So. 2d 262, 263 (Miss. 1947) (explaining that sharecropping
tenant is to use "wisdom and standards of good husbandry" in working landlord's croplands);
52A C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 802 (1968) (noting that "implied covenant... for a reasonably
diligent operation of the premises" by tenant-farmer exists between landlord and tenant-farmer).
289. Stewart, 103 So. at 45-46; see also 52A C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 802 (1968)
(stating that if landlord objects to tenant-farmer's method of cultivation, he must make such
objection prior to planting of crop by tenant-farner).
290. Stewart, 103 So. at 45-46.
291. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,402 (2000) (noting Kenseth's liability for legal
fees in event he fires his attorneys), ard, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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At harvest time, sharecropping calls for a division of the year's bounty
between the landlord and the tenant-farmer.' The tenant-fanner gives the
landlord a portion of the crop as rent for the use of the land.293 The gross
income resulting from the sale of the crop is then divided on a percentage
basis between the landlord and tenant pursuant to their agreement.294 The
tenant-farmer's portion of the gross income is classified as farm income while
the landlord's percentage constitutes rental income.295 Although the income
originates from a single crop, the IRS treats it as two different kinds of income
for the parties involved in the transaction.'
For an attorney and her client, the sharecropping analogy would allow a
favorable division of the recovery.' The client, with his underlying claim,
shifts to the attorney an interest in the recovery that is very similar to the
portion of the crop a tenant-farmer provides his landlord in rent.2" An analogy
to this transfer solves several problems for both the attorney and the client.29
First, it conforms to any bar's ethical rules that require an attorney to
refrain from obtaining an ownership interest in a client's cause of action.3°°
The attorney would no more own the underlying claim than a tenant-fanner
would own the land upon which he farms.3°' Second, the analogy properly
292. Id. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
293. See IRS Publication 225, Farmer's Tax Guide 16-17 (2001) (noting division of crops).
294. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
295. IRS Publication 225, Farmer's Tax Guide 16-17 (2001).
296. Id.; see Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (emphasizing unique
treatment of income for both landlord and tenant-farmer). -
297. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,455 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing that if clients and attorneys were treated similarly to landlords and tenant-farmers, attorney
would have ordinary income from contingency fee and client would not be charged with gross
income for attorney's contingency fee), afd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). The portion of the
recovery not paid to the attorney may be gross income to the client if the underlying claim seeks
recovery "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness" and if the recovery is
for "physical injuries suffered." See I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (West 2001) (excluding from gross
income damages, other than punitive damages, paid as compensation for physical injury or
physical sickness).
298. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (discussing contingency fee
agreement as "transfer[s] to the attorney [of] an interest in the recovery that is analogous to the
tenant farmer's share of the crop generated by his farming activities on the land leased or made
available to him by the non-active owner or sublessor").
299. See id. at 453-54 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting ethical and legal difficulties that
analogy to attorney-client relationship must answer).
300. Id. at 455 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also MoDEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.4(b) (2000) (forbidding attorney to form partnership with nonlawyer if partnership intends to
practice law).
301. See Stewart v. Young, 103 So. 44,46 (Ala. 1925) (explaining that tenant-farmer has
only "a leasehold estate in the lands" of landlord); Heaton v. Slaten, 141 So. 267, 268 (Ala. Ct.
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explains the speculative nature of a client's claim while still demonstrating the
work that may be required of the attorney to bring the claim to fruition.3" Just
as planting thousands of dollars of seed into the ground and relying on good
weather and faith to bring the crop to maturity is a venture fraught with risk,
lawsuits are risky propositions with uncertain results. 3 Nevertheless, careful,
skilled, and dedicated work by an attorney can raise the value of the client's
potential recovery and eventually increase the benefit to both client and
counsel.3" Similarly, a tenant-farmer's work in caring for his crops - prevent-
ing the growth of weeds, providing irrigation, and applying fertilizers - can
increase the yield of the crop, thus raising the amount of income for both the
farmer and his landlord."'
C. Division of Recovery in Sharecropping Analogy
Most importantly, the sharecropping analogy clearly divides the recovery
between the attorney and client for tax classification purposes. 6 The landlord,
who owns all of the crop-bearing land, is not charged with having a gross
income equal to the entire value of the crop;" instead, he is attributed only the
gross income from the percentage of the crop allotted to him in the sharecrop-
ping agreement.3"e Likewise, the agreement restricts the tenant-farmer's gross
income to the percentage of the crop which he is to take under the agreement.3 9
App. 1932) (noting that tenant-farmer possesses only leasehold interest in landlord's lands);
52A C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 801 (1968) (stating that landlord in sharecropping agreement
gives tenant-farmer estate in lands being used for growing crops, but not absolute ownership).
302. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting "farming activities" that
tenant-farmer must undertake to insure successful crops); id. at 450 (Beghe, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Kenseth's attorneys "added substantial value to [his] claim").
303. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (noting that value of Cot-
nam's legal claim was "doubtful and uncertain").
304. Id. at 125-26 (explaining that "the aid of skillful attorneys ... resulted in converting
[Cotnam's] claim into a judgment and the collection of the judgment. The amount of the con-
tingent fee was earned, and well earned by the attorneys.").
305. See Sledge v. Potts, 32 So. 2d 262, 263 (Miss. 1947) (discussing tenant-farmer's duty
to farm landlord's land under sharecropping arrangement with intent to benefit both landlord
and tenant-farmer); Heaton, 141 So. at 268 (noting tenant-farmer's duty to work in "good faith"
to improve crops).
306. See IRS Publication 225, Farmer's Tax Guide 16-17 (2001) (explaining division of
income between landlord and tenant-farmer).
307. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,455 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that
sharecropping arrangement does not call for landlord to include total value of all crops in his
gross income), affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
308. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (drawing conclusions as to portion of income included
by landlord).
309. Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting).
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For an attorney and client, the result would be the same. The client/landlord
would not have gross income in the amount of the entire recovery."' Instead,
the client would have gross income of only that percentage he agreed to take
in the contingency fee agreement.' This achieves a very desirable and fair
result for the client. 12
An attorney's daily task in a contingency fee relationship is to work the
client's claim and prepare it to bear fruit. 3 It is his or her normal profes-
sional task. 14 The payment for such work, then, is clearly ordinary income
to the attorney and should not be income to the client.315 Additionally, as the
attorney performs her work in an effort to earn ordinary income, the nature of
that work deprives the client of control over his claim.316
D. The Sharecropping Analogy and the Assignment
of Income Doctrine
This allotment of control is crucial to determining whether the assign-'
ment of income doctrine applies to the client. 7 The penultimate question is
whether the potential assignor has enough control over the income at issue to
be liable for the tax on that income.1 ' In Kenseth, Judge Beghe's dissent
310. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (interpreting implications of analogy on gross income
calculations for client).
311. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting) (analogizing tax implications of landlord to those of
client).
312. The result is desirable to the client because the client does not have his gross income
increased by the amount of the contingency fee paid to his attorney. This may reduce the
complications of the AMT. See supra note 4 (explaining calculation of AMT).
313. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,449-50(2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Kenseth's attorneys worked diligently on all aspects of case to prepare legal documents and
negotiate eventual settlement), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
314. MODELRUiLEsOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.1 (2000) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for representation.").
315. See I.R.C. § 61(2)X) (2001) (noting fees constitute income to taxpayer); Kenseth, 114
T.C. at 450 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that attorneys' "shares of the recovery should be
taxed to them directly and not run through [Kenseth]... who never even had the chance to kiss
goodbye what [he] never became entitled to receive").
316. See supra notes 261-84 and accompanying text (noting how attorneys' responsibilities
deprive clients of control over clients' lawsuits and recoveries).
317. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that "the governing law
permits - indeed compels - the ultimate finding that Mr. Kenseth did not retain enough control
over his claim to justify including in his gross income any part of the contingent fee paid to his
attorneys").
318. See Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,604 (1948) (noting that "[t]he crucial question
remains whether the assignor retains sufficient power and control over the assigned property or
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answers this question with a definitive "no."319 As the sharecropping analogy
demonstrates, the work that the attorney expends on behalf of the client
effectively denies the client control over his claim. 2° The client is not assign-
ing a stream or source of income to the attorney.321 Instead, the client allows
the attorney to work on the client's claim just as a landlord allows a tenant-
farmer to work on his land: 22
In the seminal assignment of income cases, Earl and Horst, the "assign-
ees" of the income had to expend no effort to obtain the income.323 They were
the recipients of a definite and secure source of income, whether it was a
salary or interest coupons on negotiable bonds.3"4 By contrast, the underlying
claim for a contingency fee agreement is inherently speculative, and neither
the attorney nor the client has any assurance of obtaining a recovery."2 While
the assignment of income doctrine clearly governs cases such as Earl and
Horst, in which the assignee has not essentially earned his income, it is not
clear that the doctrine should apply to contingency fee arrangements.32 6
over receipt of the income to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income for
tax purposes").
319. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399,440 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting), aff'd, 259 F.3d
881 (7th Cir. 2001).
320. See Sledge v. Potts, 32 So. 2d 262, 263 (Miss.- 1947) (explaining that tenant in
sharecropping arrangement utilizes his "wisdom" as guide to control cultivation of crops); supra
notes 261-79 and accompanying text (emphasizing that attorneys' work on contingency fee
cases often shifts control over claims and recoveries to attorneys and from clients).
321. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (stating that in sharecropping
analogy client only transfers to attorney underlying claim (land in sharecropping analogy) for
attorney to work and bring about gain for both attorney and client).
322. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 455 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (analogizing attorney's work on
client's claim to tenant-farmer's work on landlord's land); see also Sledge, 32 So. 2d at 263
(explaining duty of tenant to provide "reasonable rental" to landlord in the form of "a diligent
tillage" of croplands using "the wisdom and standards of good husbandry").
323. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940) (noting that transfer of interest
coupons to Horst's son was gift from Horst to his son); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14
(1930) (noting that Earl's wife had to expend no effort or work to obtain one-half of her
husband's salary).
324. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (noting son collected interest at maturity date of bonds);
Earl, 281 U.S. at 114 (noting that Earl's source of income was salary). Neither opinion makes
any reference to any speculative or uncertain attribute of the sources of income for the assign-
ments. One can safely assume that the sources of income at issue in Horst and Earl were more
secure than a claim of age discrimination in employment.
325. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 439 (Beghe, J., dissenting), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001).
326. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 120 (emphasizing that doctrine of assignment of income
governs gift of interest coupons to Horst's son); Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15 (noting essentially
that Earl's salary cannot be assigned, for tax purposes, to one who did not earn it).
TAX TREATMENT OF CONTINGENCY FEES
Furthermore, the historical background of the assignment of income
doctrine reveals that the doctrine originated in cases involving intrafamily
donative transfers.3 27 Contingency fee agreements, to the contrary, are gener-
ally not intrafamily donative transactions undertaken for tax avoidance.3 28
Both an attorney who agrees to represent a new client on a contingency fee
basis and the new client enter into a common business transaction in which
neither had a previous interest.3 29 Based on the lack of control that Kenseth
had over his claim and the obvious distinction between the Earl and Horst
cases and contingency fee cases, the assignment of income doctrine should notapply to contingency fees. 3 Kenseth's lawyers earned their contingency fee;
Kenseth did not assign it to them.
33'
E. The Sharecropping Analogy and Attorney's Lien Law
As for the state attorney's lien doctrine, Judge Beghe asserted that Wiscon-
sin's attorney's lien statute should be construed similarly to the Alabama
statute in Cotnam, allowing an attorney to obtain an equitable interest in his
client's suit and recovery.3 2 This assertion alone provides sufficient support
for Kenseth's argument that his gross income should not include his attorney's
contingency fee.333 However, Judge Beghe refused to rest the ultimate out-
come of the decision on the Wisconsin statute: "To make the result depend
upon whether a technical ownership interest was transferred under state law
would make the outcome depend on 'attenuated subtleties' and 'refinements'
327. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 114 (noting that gift of interest coupons was to Horst's son);
Earl, 281 U.S. at 113-14 (noting that contract at issue was between Earl and his wife).
328. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th
Cir. 2000) (noting that contingency fee agreement had "no purpose to shift tax liability among
members of a family").
329. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 440 (Beghe, J., dissenting) ("[A] contingent fee agreement
is a commercial transaction between parties with no preexisting common interest .... .).
330. See id. at 446 (Beghe, J., dissenting) ("The contingent fee agreement did not effect
an assignment of income ... under... Helvering v. Horst and Lucas v. Ear?' (citations
omitted)).
331. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text (discussing how attorneys earn their
contingency fees).
332. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 436 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) ("Wisconsin
law arguably gives attorneys the two unusual interests in their clients' lawsuits relied on by the
majority opinion in Colnam v. Commissioner." (citation omitted)), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
2001).
333. See id. (noting implication of Beghe's argument); see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263
F.2d 119,125 (5th Cir. 1959) (deciding that interests of attorney, granted by Alabama attorney's
lien statute, in client's claim and recovery allows client to exclude contingency fees from gross
income).
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that... should be disregarded.'0 34 Further reliance on state law standards for
determining federal income tax questions will only lead to a greater lack of
uniformity for both clients and attorneys .33  As Judge Beghe argues, future
clients who challenge the inclusion of contingency fees in their gross income
will be able to rely on the broad standard of the sharecropping analogy to
properly characterize clients' lack of control over their claims. 36 In essence,
the sharecropping analogy supersedes the state law doctrine, rendering it moot.
Using the sharecropping analogy, all clients, whether they reside in Alabama
or Alaska, will be able to exclude contingency fees from their gross income.337
VI. Conclusion
Contingency fees, like any other form of income, should be taxed solely
to the person who earns them.3 Courts should determine who bears the tax
liability for contingency fees by asking who controls the underlying claim and,
thus, the recovery at issue; control is the key issue in this tax analysis. In a
lawsuit, the attorney controls almost every aspect of the client's case. The
attorney devises a strategy for handling the claim, files the briefs, takes
depositions, negotiates, and prepares for trial. The entire course and direction
of the client's claim is in the attorney's hands.
A lawyer does not immediately accrue this strong degree of control over
her client's case just by signing a contingency fee agreement. However, once
the parties sign that agreement, an inevitable and irreversible shift of control
begins. The lawyer's control over the case grows on a daily basis. As the
lawyer becomes more heavily invested in the case, the ability of the client to
terminate the relationship fades. The potential legal fees that a client may owe
if he chooses to fire his attorney prior to a final resolution of the case effec-
tively keep the client and his claim firmly within the control of the attorney.
Soon, the effect is all too apparent: the client is no longer in complete control
of his case and recovery.
334. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 447 (Beghe, ., dissenting).
335. See id. at 44647 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that decisions based on attorney's
lien laws are neither necessary nor desired); supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text
(emphasizing differences in rights granted by state attorney's lien statutes).
336. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 446 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting that future decisions can
rely on rationale of Cotnam, Estate of Clarks, and rationale and analogies in Beghe's dissent).
337. See id. (Beghe, I., dissenting) (noting that if attorney obtains "only the usual security
interest in the claim," client will be able to exclude contingency fees from gross income). The
client need not live in a state such as Alabama or Michigan where "local law allows a transfer
of a 'proprietary' interest in the claim to the attorney." Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting).
338. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441,449 (1973) ("Income must be taxed to him who
eams it." (citation omitted)).
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As a result of this control-shifting process, contingency fees are not
property attributable to a client's gross income. A client only has income to
the extent that he can control the underlying source of that income. As future
courts analyze contingency fee cases, they should take into account the control
shift that is inherent in a contingency fee agreement. However, many courts
evaluate control over contingency fees using modes of analysis that are
couched solely in terms of absolutes. Under the assignment of income doc-
trine, either the client has complete control over the disposition of the contin-
gency fee or he does not. Under the attorney's lien doctrine, the attorney
either has an ownership interest in the contingency fee or she does not. These
methods of analysis fail to address the middle ground. The level of control
that either an attorney or client has in an attorney-client relationship cannot
be described in absolute terms. Thus, any analysis of this relationship must
allow room for a shift in control.
In meeting this requirement, the sharecropping analogy comes into its
own. Sharecropping, like almost any agricultural endeavor, is seldom a
certain undertaking. The seasons and the weather may change unexpectedly,
varying the return that a sharecropper and his landlord receive for their efforts.
Likewise, in a contingent fee attorney-client relationship, nothing about the
return is certain. Viewing clients as landlords and attorneys as tenants has
many positive results. First, it accurately characterizes the shift in control that
occurs as the attorney delves further into the client's case. Like a tenant-
farmer who has planted his crops, the attorney invests his time and energy in
the client's claim. Like a landlord, the client cannot discharge the attorney
without making payment of accrued attorney's fees. Second, the sharecrop-
ping analogy provides for distinct treatment of the income generated by the
agreement for both parties. The attorney will have ordinary income in the
contingency fee, and the client will have income in the amount he actually
recovers. This approach can lessen the devastating impact of the AMT.
Finally, the sharecropping analogy characterizes the true speculative nature
of a contingency fee case. In sharecropping, the final yield of the crop deter-
mines the landlord's as well as the tenant's portion of the income. Likewise,
the amount of the final recovery determines the attorney's take in a contin-
gency fee case.
The sharecropping analogy succeeds because it properly characterizes the
relationship between a client and his contingency-fee attorney. They are not
partners or co-owners, they are not involved in a joint venture, and they are
not dividing up concrete, value-certain property. They are trying to obtain
redress for a legal wrong. The client knows that alone, he will not be able to
obtain compensation for the wrong. Only with an attorney does the client
have a genuine chance of recovery. With an attorney, however, the client also
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loses control over his case in exchange for the opportunity to obtain monetary
damages.
Judge Beghe predicts the outcome of future cases in which clients rely
on the sharecropping analogy and the control analysis: The sharecropping
analogy and the broad national standard
provide[ ] an independent and sufficient ground for the holding, decoupled
from the narrow ground of Cotnam and Estate of Clarks regarding attor-
neys' ownership interests in lawsuits under State law, that [the client's]
gross income in the case... does not include any part of the settlement
proceeds paid to [the client's attorneys] and retained by [the attorneys] as
[their] contingency fee.'
This broad, new federal standard for evaluating the tax consequences of con-
tingency fees should be applied in all contingency fee cases. Such an ap-
proach will bring uniformity to an unsettled issue of federal taxation and
reduce the need for reliance on state law. It will reduce the tax burden on
clients and help lessen the impact of the AMT. Last, but certainly not least,
the client can hope to recognize the true economic value of his underlying
claim.
339. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 446 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting), aff'd, 259 F.3d
881 (7th Cir. 2001).
